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JUDICIAL CAPRICE
Eric J. Miller*
ABSTRACT
Caprice — the personal preference of the judge — is an available and
legitimate basis for judicial decision. On certain occasions, neither law nor
morality provides a decisive ground for decision and all that is left is the
judge’s taste or inclination. Here, she has both the legal power and the legal
right to decide whichever way she wishes.
Perhaps because it looks like a naked exercise of power, caprice, as a basis
for judicial decision, is not terribly popular. Capricious choice is often
characterized as non-rational because not based upon a particular type of
reason — what might be called a decisive reason for decision. Reason-based
decision, by contrast, is represented as demonstrating that some decisive
reason overrides competing ones to settle the outcome of a legal dispute,
independent of the judge’s will. Absent such a reason, judicial decision
consists of an arbitrary exercise of the power authoritatively to resolve cases.
My claim is that capricious decision-making, whether rational or not, is an
inevitable feature of legal decision in a complex legal system, one in which
there are conflicts among incommensurable reasons for decision. Where
legal incommensurability is matched by extra-legal incommensurability,
there may be no correct thing to do. The judge is free to pick among the
available options.
A major trend in recent legal positivism is to claim that incommensurability
does not entail the sort of judicial discretion characterized by capricious
choice. The judge has only “weak” discretion to resolve the case because
extra-legal reasons bind the judge.
Whatever the merits of the weak discretion thesis generally, I argue that
incommensurability provides the judge with the sort of strong discretion
symptomatic of judicial caprice. In such circumstances, the legal system
provides, not only the power to decide capriciously, but the right to do so.
Capricious decision thus confounds those theories of adjudication that seek to
constrain or minimize judicial discretion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Can caprice operate as a legitimate basis for judicial decision?1
Sometimes, it appears, the outcome of the case is up to the personal
preference of the judge: she can decide whichever way she wishes.
Neither law nor morality2 provides a decisive ground for decision and
she is presented with a “choice between open alternatives.”3 The
problem here is not just one of constraint, but of rationality. Not only
does reason fail to require a particular outcome, but the judge cannot
choose between the options on the basis of reasons at all. All that is
left is her taste or inclination.
Standard descriptions of capricious choice identify a familiar range of
psychological sources for the resulting judicial decision. These include
the “judicial hunch” or what the judge had for breakfast, as well as
Whatever the
political ideology, whether conscious or not.4
psychological basis for the resulting decision, having picked a
particular option the judge can only try to render her decision
acceptable post hoc, by operation of the “characteristic judicial
virtues…: impartiality and neutrality in surveying the alternatives;
consideration for the interest of all who will be affected; and a concern
to deploy some acceptable general principle.”5 None of these virtues
are decisive; rather, they provide the judge with cover for her personal
preference.
Perhaps because it looks like a naked exercise of power, caprice, as a
basis for judicial decision, is not terribly popular. Capricious choice is
often characterized as non-rational: either as having no basis in reason
1

I use caprice as an equivalent to what Oliver Wendell Holmes called the judge’s
“instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions,” OLIVER WENDELL HOMES,
THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). Decisions based on an individual's instinctive
preference or personal taste do not count as reasons for decision. Rather, our tastes,
inclinations, and preferences are “reason-dependent” endorsements of values or
goods. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 140, 308 (1986); JOSEPH
RAZ, ENGAGING REASON: ON THE THEORY OF VALUE AND ACTION 50-54 (1999).
2
Nor ethics, politics or some other determinate, extra-legal scheme of value.
3
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127 (2d ed., Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph
Raz, eds., 1994).
4
See, e.g., Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the
“Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L. Q. 274 (1929); JEROME FRANK, LAW
AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision: Or
How Judges Think, 11 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 357, 358-59 (1925).
5
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 205 (2d ed., Penelope A. Bulloch &
Joseph Raz, eds., 1994).
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because not based upon reasons or, more accurately, as not based upon
a particular type of reason — what might be called a decisive or
“conclusive” reason for decision.6 Absent such a reason, judicial
decision is often presented as an act of will or fiat, an arbitrary exercise
of the power authoritatively to resolve cases.
Reason-based decision, by contrast, is often represented as
demonstrating that some dominant or decisive reason overrides
competing reasons and operates to settle the outcome of a conflict or
dispute.7 In the law, a decisive legal reason identifies that outcome
antecedently required by the pre-existing norms of the legal system.
The judge’s decision is legally valid only to the extent that it matches
the legal rules or standards to the facts of the instant case.8 Reason thus
constrains the judge to defer to that outcome, identified independent of
her will.
Complex, modern municipal legal systems are, however, gappy: on
occasion, no single legal reason determines the outcome. According to
reason-based theories of decision, even when there is a gap in the law,
capricious decisions are an inadequate and inappropriate means of
resolving legal disputes.9 When, for example, none of the legal rules
or standards provides a decisive reason for decision, the judge should
nonetheless seek some decisive extra-legal reason in order to break the
deadlock.10 Capricious decisions — ones that express the will or
personal preference of the judge rather than some required outcome —
are outside the judge’s legitimate authority.
Caprice thus marks the point at which reason no longer operates to
determine the outcome. The judge must choose between multiple
options, none of which is stronger than the others. No further decisive
6

JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 27-28 (1990).
JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 25-27 (1990).
8
See, e.g., Brian Bix, Book Review: Positively Positivism (Review of Legal
Positivism in American Jurisprudence by Anthony J. Sebok), 85 VA. L REV. 889,
898-99 (1999) (citing Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term —
Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1961); Robert Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). See also
Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 982 (1978).
9
See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1 11-17 (1959) (criticizing judicial “act[s] of willfulness or will”).
10
Joseph Raz calls this type of reasoning “reasoning according to law.” For a full
discussion, see Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIS, 1,
8 (1993). See also JOSEPH See JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 339
(1995) (discussing the role of moral and institutional reasons for decision in legal
decision-making).
7
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reason resolves the outcome. Although a variety of circumstances
might account for the absence of decisive reasons, I am particularly
interested in incommensurable conflicts among legally valid rules. I
draw a distinction between decisively regulated cases, where the law
resolves the conflict among reasons to provide a uniquely required
outcome, and completely-but-indecisively regulated cases, where there
are multiple legally acceptable outcomes, but no single outcome is
required.11 Here the scope of the legal decision may be limited to
selecting among the available outcomes. Although the available
choices are legally valid ones, the law does not mandate any particular
result, and there is room for the judge’s personal preference to operate.
My claim is that capricious decision-making is an inevitable feature of
legal decision in a complex legal system, one in which there is a certain
amount of indeterminacy and, in particular, conflicts among
incommensurable
reasons
for
decision.
Where
legal
incommensurability is matched by moral or other incommensurability
there may be no correct thing to do. The judge is free to pick among
the available options.
A major trend in legal positivism has been to suggest that legal gaps do
not entail discretion. Extra-legal reasons may operate to close the gap,
and the judge has only “weak” discretion to resolve the case.12 The
goal of such weak-discretion theories is, I suggest, similar to what
H.L.A. Hart once called “the Noble Dream”:13 to demonstrate the
manner in which extra-legal reasons, though prima facie not legally
obligatory, nonetheless bind the judge.
Whatever the merits of the weak discretion thesis generally, I argue that
in a discrete set of circumstances the judge possess the sort of strong
discretion symptomatic of judicial caprice. I take for granted that rules
can provide determinate guidance and that there is a core meaning to
the language of a rule that renders it applicable across a range of
cases.14 I am concerned with the narrower issue of conflicts among
11

See John Gardner, Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J.L.
STUD. 457-58 (1988); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 75 (1979).
12
See Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 33 (1967),
reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); John Gardner,
Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J.L. STUD. 457-58 (1988).
13
H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and
the Noble Dream, in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
123, 134 (1993).
14
See H.L.A. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW 124 (2d ed. 1994). Neil MacCormick glosses
Hart thus: “it is (certainly in Hart’s view) a particular feature of governance that
under law that state legal orders are characterized by the existence of institutions and
procedures for formulating in relatively clear, precise and authoritative ways those
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determinate rules. Even when rules provide clear direction, multiple
legally valid rules may conflict in such a manner that none overrides
the other. Here, there is no right answer to the question, “Legally, what
ought I to do?” At this point, capricious choice is both available and
permissible.
In Section II, I develop an account of capricious decision in contrast to
Joseph Raz’s reason-based account. Raz considers personal preference
forms too unpredictable and partisan a basis for judicial decision. He
suggests that law as a public, institutional system of governance
according to rules requires the court to operate as an applicative
institution bound to apply those rules. In such a system, individuals are
entitled to expect the rules to be applied in a predictable and neutral
manner. The judge should therefore find some objective, decisive
reason to break the tie. Accordingly, Raz proposes a hierarchy of
available tie-breaking reasons: legal, moral, and doctrinal.15
In the usual situation, where the law provides set of identifiable reasons
for decision and precludes the operation of competing non-legal
reasons, the judge ought to rely upon valid legal reasons to decide the
case. Where the law runs out, Raz believes morality operates to fill the
legal gap. He advocates two theses to explain the turn to morality. The
first holds that law and morality address similar issues and so overlap.
Morality is thus a readily available alternative to legal reasons. The
second holds that a judge ought to act morally when the law runs out,
so that where moral reasons prove decisive she should choose the
morally best outcome.16
Morality, however, may prove indecisive. Moral reasons may be
conflicting and incommensurable. Raz then proposes that doctrinal
reasons, those more general legal reasons organizing a range of rules
and cases, might provide a decisive reason. Raz’s theory of
adjudication is thus a search for public, decisive reasons. Morality and
doctrine both provide a neutral, predictable, and transparent basis for
decision where personal preference cannot.

governing standards of conduct which are ‘legal.’” NEIL MACCORMICK, H. L. A.
HART 42 (1981). Whether or not Hart is correct is not the subject of his paper; if he
is wrong, we are much closer to the Realist “nightmare” than Hart would care to
think.
15
See Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIS 1, 7 (1993),
reprinted in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995).
16
Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIS 1, 14 (1993),
reprinted in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995); See JOSEPH RAZ,
ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 339 (1995).
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In Section III, as a first line of criticism, I suggest that doctrine, like
morality, may prove conflicted and incommensurable. Accordingly,
where there is thoroughgoing incommensurability, that is, where legal
incommensurability is matched by both moral and doctrinal
incommensurability, there is no decisive reason to dictate the outcome.
The judge must exercise her personal preference to select one among
the legally valid alternatives. Whichever outcome is chosen will have
been chosen without some (legal or other) reason deciding the outcome.
Because the resulting decision will be valid as a matter of law, the
judge thus has a legal power to decide the case as she wants, even on a
whim.
In Section IV, I argue that caprice is not only an available but also a
permissible basis for judicial decision, conferring not only a power but
a right. In deciding capriciously, the judge is acting not only upon a
legally generated ability, but also upon a legally implied permission.
The existence of a permission to rely upon capricious choice depends
upon the manner in which legal and extra-legal norms conflict. Legal
permissions may be express or implied: an implied permission to rely
upon a particular reason exists where there is no reason forbidding so
relying. Permissions may thus be generated by the absence of some
norm to the contrary. Where the various options conflict and are
legally, morally, and doctrinally incommensurable, there is no decisive
reason and no outcome mandated.17
The available reasons thus fail to constrain choice as between the
different outcomes. What results is what I call a pragmatic permission
to choose among the legally valid outcomes without giving further,
decisive reasons. The existence of a pragmatic permission thus
suggests that judge is both empowered and entitled to rely upon caprice
as a basis for judicial decision when faced with legal
incommensurability that is matched by moral and doctrinal
incommensurability.
The permission to engage in capricious decision makes sense given the
requirement that the judge render a decision when faced with the
parties’ conflicting claims. Judicial decision is not like moral decision:
in the latter case, the decision-maker may simply decline to

17

See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 85-88 (1990); JOSEPH RAZ,
THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 75 (1979); John Gardner, Concerning Permissive Sources
and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J.L. STUD. 457-58 (1988).
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adjudicate.18 Where the judge is obliged to pick one or other outcome,
and public, decisive reasons give out, the personal preference may be
all that is left to a decision-maker.
The pragmatic permission to judge based on personal preference
conflicts with the Legal Process schools emphasis on legal balancing
and reasoned elaboration from the extant legal principles. Capricious
decision-making exists because where incommensurability precludes
balancing the various options and the process of elaboration fails to
identify a unique outcome. Under these circumstances, choice turns on
personal preference rather than institutional norms.
II. LEGAL GAPS AND JUDICIAL CHOICE
Much recent positivist theorizing about the scope of judicial discretion
attempts to demonstrate that judges may have only weak discretion.19 I
am more interested in resuscitating or reinvigorating the thesis that, on
occasion, judges have strong discretion. Such discretion exists, for
example, where indeterminacy in law is matched by indeterminacy in
morality. Wherever the judge looks for guidance, none is forthcoming.
In the analytic tradition, H.L.A. Hart was perhaps the most significant
figure to endorse strong discretion. He suggested that, on occasion,
judges are faced with a “choice between open alternatives.”20 While
18

Perhaps the most notable argument against the requirement that judges decide the
cases before them is advance by Alexander Bickel, see ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962), and more recently taken up by Cass Sunstein,
see CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (1999). Both advocate a policy of judicial minimalism, whereby the United
States Supreme Court, in particular, avoid deciding controversial cases or issues
using a variety of procedural techniques.
19
See, e.g., John Gardner, Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J.L.
STUD. 457-58 (1988); JOSPEH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995); Neil
MacCormick, Reconstruction After Deconstruction: A Response To CLS, 10
OXFORD. J. LEGAL STUD. 539, 544 (1990); John Finnis, On The Critical Legal
Studies Movement, in: OXFORD ESSAYS ON JURISPRUDENCE: THIRD SERIES 145,
160-61 (John Eekelaar and John Bell, eds., 1987). MacCormick and Finnis develop
these claims in response to the CLS indeterminacy thesis; Gardner and Raz have
other fish to fry.
20
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127 (2d ed., Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph
Raz, eds., 1994). A different situation is where, with our without discretion, the
judge opts to ignore the law. One might call this judicial nullification by comparison
with jury nullification. Here, the judge’s decision gains its institutional authority, if
at all, after the fact. The decision, because not required by the law, has the same
status as a mistaken decision: it is authoritative for the parties and subordinate legal
officials because the judge is empowered, if not entitled, to render a decision. It
becomes authoritative for judges of equal or higher rank subject to their acquiescence

6

JUDICIAL CAPRICE
the law may limit the range of available options, it does not require a
particular decision. Without rules to guide her, the judge’s choice as
between the available options is unconstrained.21
The weak discretion thesis holds that legal indeterminacy need not
result in unconstrained decision-making. Rather, the judge must choose
among a limited range of options to elaborate the available legal
standards where their application in a particular case is not automatic.22
Ronald Dworkin originally coined weak discretion to demonstrate that
adjudication consists in the reasoned elaboration of legal principles that
control, albeit non-“mechanically,” the outcome of a case.23 The judge
gets all the guidance she requires from legal principles: she need not
turn outside law to find gap-closing standards.
Dworkin soon reformulated his thesis to include among the relevant
legal principles those derived from “political morality.”24 More
recently, Dworkin has emphasized the relative transparency of legal
and ratification. For a somewhat radical embrace of this position, see Richard A.
Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2005) (arguing the
Supreme Court is not bound by legal norms and acts in a fully political way). Under
such circumstances, “all that succeeds is success.” H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 153 (2d ed., Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz, eds., 1994).
21
See H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare
and the Noble Dream, in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
123, 124-26 (1993).This description of strong discretion comports with Dworkin,
who asserts strong discretion exists where, “on some issue [an official] is simply not
bound by standards set by the authority in question.” Ronald Dworkin, The Model of
Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 33 (1967), reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); see also Ronald Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal
Theory, 81 Yale. L.J. 855, 879 (1972) (reprinted as The Model of Rules II) in
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
22
Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 33 (1967), reprinted
in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978). “Sometimes we use
‘discretion’ in a weak sense, simply to say that for some reason the standards an
official must apply cannot be applied mechanically but demand the use of judgment.”
Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 32 (1967). Dworkin
also suggested that weak discretion could refer to a different situation, where “some
official has final authority to make a decision and cannot be reviewed and reversed
by any other official.” Id.
23
Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 35-6 (1967),
reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978). See also Brian
Leiter, Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in
Jurisprudence, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 17 (2003) (discussing Dworkin’s distinction between
weak and strong discretion)
24
See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 Yale. L.J. 855, 878882 (1972) (reprinted as The Model of Rules II) in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057,
1082 (1975); Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1978);
both reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
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reasoning to moral theorizing about public reasons.25 The judge is to
approach each legal problem by attempting to provide the morally best
and most coherent reconstruction of the rules and values of her legal
system. The general requirement that the judge select one side in a
dispute and the fact that the judge does not reinvent the law but must
accommodate the outcome within an extant body of legal and political
materials entails, Dworkin believes, that in each case there can be only
one “best” justification.26
Dworkin asserts that, because positivists believe that the law “runs
out,” they must endorse some version of strong discretion whereby
judicial decision is unconstrained by legal principles. According to
Dworkin, in other words, the positivist “sources thesis” entails that
when there is a legal gap the judge may base her decision on any
reason, unconstrained by law.27 One positivist response to Dworkin
points to the limited range of options generally facing a judge. Her
discretion is “weak” in that she is constrained to pick one among the
legally valid options.28 I am concerned primarily with Joseph Raz’s
alternative thesis that, additionally, morality, though not part of law,
nonetheless provides reason-based limits to judicial discretion.
I have no quibble, in certain circumstances, with the positivist embrace
of weak discretion. In this section, however, my point is that weak
discretion is not always the only option open to a judge. On occasion,
judges are constrained to exercise weak discretion; but strong discretion
is an inherent possibility in a system in which legal incommensurability
is matched by moral and doctrinal incommensurability. In such
circumstances, none of the available reasons for decision are decisive,
and some remain undefeated.
The alternative, which is a full embrace of the weak-discretion thesis,
represents a variation of the “Noble Dream”:

25

Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1978); reprinted
in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
26
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
27
Dworkin suggests that positivists claim “that when judges disagree about matters
of principle they disagree not about what the law requires but about how their
discretion should be exercised. They disagree, that is, not about where their duty to
decide lies, but about how they ought to decide, all things considered, given that they
have no duty to decide either way.” Ronald Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal
Theory, 81 Yale. L.J. 855, 879 (1972) (reprinted as The Model of Rules II) in
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978)
28
See John Gardner, Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J.L.
STUD. 457-59 (1988).
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that, in spite of superficial appearances to the contrary . . . still
an explanation and a justification can be provided for the
common expectation of litigants that judges should apply to
their cases existing law and not make new law for them, even
when the test of particular constitutional provisions, statutes,
or available precedents appears to offer no determinate
guide.29

I will suggest that Raz endorses a positivist variant of the weakdiscretion thesis. His weak-discretion positivism departs from the
Noble Dream in rejecting the claim that existing law is sufficient to
determine all legal problems. Existing law, Raz claims, may be
indecisive or gappy; nonetheless, morality often provides a determinate
outcome where law does not (and if morality does not, doctrine will).
The Noble Dreamers thus agree that some decisive reason is required to
justify judicial decision; they disagree is over whether that gap-closing
morality is part of the law or not.30
A. Courts as Applicative Institutions
Raz famously believes that, from the “point of view” of the system,31
legal rules are exclusionary reasons for action that provide an
authoritative and binding reason for individuals to regulate their
behavior.32 Exclusionary reasons are both first-order reasons for action
and second-order reasons that preclude decision-makers from relying
on conflicting non-legal reasons in determining what to do. Law is thus
an “exclusionary system” that “exclude[s the] application of rules,
standards and norms which do not belong to the system or are not
recognized by it.”33 Therefore only legal reasons should be considered
in deciding what one ought to do if one is to be guided by the law.
What I now want to consider is the role of the courts in enforcing legal
norms.

29

See H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare
and the Noble Dream, in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
123, 132 (1993).
30
See BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 99-101 (1993).
31
See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 139.
32
See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 65-9 (1990); see also Joseph
Raz, Reasons For Action, Decisions and Norms, in PRACTICAL REASONING, (Joseph
Raz ed., 1978); and Joseph Raz, Facing Up: A Reply, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, at
1154-1179 (1989).
33
JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 145
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According to Raz, the legal system is not only an exclusionary, but also
an institutionalized system of norms.34 The characteristic feature an
institutionalized system is the presence of what Raz terms “primary
norm-applying organs”:35 officials or “institutions with power to
determine the normative situation of specified individuals, which are
required to exercise these powers by applying existing norms, but
whose decisions are binding, even when wrong.”36 These applicative
institutions have, according to Raz’s definition, three features. By
virtue of their institutional role they are granted a power;37 that power is
a limited one, confined to the application of the institution’s norms; 38
and their application is authoritative and final upon the subjects of the
norms.39
In a legal system, courts count among the various applicative
institutions of the system.40 The court’s applicative determinations are
made on the basis of the existing norms of the system, not, for example,
at the discretion of the judge. Thus, although on occasion courts may
make law, what distinguishes the court as an applicative institution, and
the law as an institutional system, is the courts’ declarative (rather than
legislative) role.41
In contrast to the purely applicative role, a court could have (at least)
two different types of discretion. First, one in which the adjudication34

This statement involves at least two different claims; first, that the law is a system
of norms; and second, that the law is an institutionalized system. For a collection of
norms to be held to form a system, the norms must be internally related: its rules,
standards and principles possess “a certain unity and interdependence” JOSEPH RAZ,
PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 113 . For more on law as an institutional system of
norms, see JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS ch. 4, Raz, The Concept of
a Legal System chs. 6 and 7, MacCormick and Weinberger, An Institutional Theory
of Law ; MacCormick, Law As Institutional Fact (1974) 90 LQR; MacCormick,
Legal Reasoning and the Institutional Theory of Law, 9 Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 14.
35
JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 136.
36
JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 136.
37
According to H.L.A. Hart, this power is granted through the existence of “rules of
adjudication”: those “secondary rules empowering individuals to make authoritative
determinations of the question whether, on a particular occasion, a primary rule has
been broken…[such rules] confer judicial powers and a special status on judicial
declarations about the breach of obligations.” H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
96-97 (2d ed. 1994).
38
See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 132-3.
39
Raz believes these features are essential to all primary norm-applying organs of
institutionalised normative systems. See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND
NORMS ch. 4.
40
Raz points out that “tribunals and other judicial bodies…[and even] other officials,
such as police officers, may also be primary organs.” JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL
REASON AND NORMS 136.
41
JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 137-7 (2d ed., 1990).
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rendering institutions are not required to decide on basis of specified
rules, but instead are able to select, at their own discretion, the reasons
on which they wish to rely in giving a decision.42 Such institutions are
different from primary organs in that they do not apply the (actionguiding) norms of a system, but merely adjudicate disputes on the
balance of reasons, which they are free to select. This envisages the
adjudicative process as one in which the court always possesses “strong
discretion,”43 and its primary function is to render judgment between
parties rather than apply systematized standards of behavior.
Second, an adjudication-rendering institution could have a duty to
apply the norms of the system, but possess the discretion to ignore
those rules that failed some generalized merit test. Here the
adjudicative institution is concerned with the guiding function of the
institutional system to a limited extent, but is willing to compromise
this function when it judges that, all things considered, there is some
better decision than that which could be reached by applying the norms,
e.g., one which in the circumstances is more just or efficient. This
envisages the court as possessing the power and the right to nullify the
law based on certain extra-legal standards.
Neither sort of discretion is compatible with Raz’s definition of an
applicative institution. Rather, such institutions are ”'bound to apply…a
certain body of norms regardless of their views of the merits and are
allowed to act on their views only to the extent that this is allowed by
these norms.”44 This is to stress the norm-applying function of the
courts.45
Courts acts solely in its applicative or declarative role when the law
decisively regulates the outcome.46 A case is regulated when the legal
norms, on their own, determine the range of possible legal decisions; a
42

The sort of system in which such adjudicatory institutions occur Raz calls
“systems of absolute discretion”; see JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS
pp. 137-140.
43
Brian Leiter points out that, “The distinction between strong and weak discretion is
Dworkin's, not Hart's, and it seems to obscure rather than illuminate Hart's actual
reasons for thinking judges have discretion. Hart need not maintain that in cases of
discretion, judges are bound by no authoritative standards: there may, indeed, be
binding standards that narrow the range of possible decisions.” Brian Leiter, Beyond
the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence, 48 AM. J.
JURIS. 17, 21 (2003).
44
JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 139.
45
See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 142.
46
See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 182 (1979) (“a regulated dispute is one
to which the law provides a solution. The judge can be seen here in his classical
image: he identifies the law, determines the facts, and applies the law to the facts.”).
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case is decisively regulated where there is one unique outcome to the
case.47 All the court must do is correctly enforce the outcome
stipulated by the rules. In a complex institutional system, however,
there will be cases in which the rules purport to guide behavior but fail
to enable a purely applicative determination to be made. Where the
legal norms support multiple options, the case is indecisively
regulated;48 where the norms fail to provide guidance given the
circumstances, then the case is unregulated so that the court faces a
case of first impression. In either circumstance, the manner in which
an agent is to comply with the rules is legally indeterminate.
When the law is indeterminate, it would not be correct to say that any
proposed determination is uniquely required by the legal rules. Instead,
the judge must turn outside the legal system for guidance or pick
among the competing outcomes without considering non-legal reasons.
Here the judge can no longer simple declare which outcome the law
requires and so must make a legislative choice in selecting an outcome.
Raz considers that such cases express a legal gap.49
B. Conflicts Among Incommensurable Reasons
I am particularly interested in the sort of indeterminacy arising from
conflicts of incommensurable reasons. Legal rules or standards are
incommensurable or fragmented if competing options represent
radically different schemes of valuing.50 Rather than aligning on some
unitary scale such as importance or authoritativeness, the competing
values “talk past” each other. Incommensurability represents a
challenge to more harmonious accounts of value and provides one
potential source of strong discretion.
Incommensurability may be contrasted with more traditional accounts
of rational action as dependant upon identifying one option that,
because supported by the weightiest reasons, dominates or overrides
the others. In this situation, if the agent is to be guided by reason in her
decision, she must compare the relevant reasons and act on whichever

47

Either because some reason overrides or excludes competing options, or because
competing options are rendered null by some canceling condition. See John Gardner,
Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J.L. STUD. 457-58 (1988);
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 70 (1979).
48
See John Gardner, Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J.L.
STUD. 457-58 (1988).
49
50

See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 70 (1979).

Thomas Nagel, The Fragmentation of Value, in THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL
QUESTIONS 128 (1979).
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is the strongest one.51 This style of rational justification requires the
agent to “weigh”52 or “balance”53 or “rank”54 (by “strength” or
“importance”55) or otherwise commensurate the various competing
reasons and identify one of them as decisive (or “conclusive”56), that is,
one that “overrides,”57 or “outweighs”58 the other relevant competing
reasons.
This traditional account of rational decision is exemplified by the
“balancing test,” one of the central components of the American
version of weak discretion.59 Balancing is a means of comparing
competing interests by weighing them one against the other. In order
for the balancing test to work, there most be some value-neutral way to
reduce the competing interests to a single currency and then compare
them.60 It thus provides an applicative account legal decision. When
51

Coleman recognizes the problems with such an assertion. See Jules L. Coleman,
The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 15 n.3 (1995) (“To say that
what I ought to do depends on the reasons that apply to me is not to say that the
justification of everything I do is settled by reason and reason alone. There are many
choices I am justified in making for which I cannot offer conclusory reasons. Still,
reasons figure prominently in determining what I ought to do.”).
52
See BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 97 (1993); see also
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, 115 (1980). See also JOHN
FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS, 87-88 (1983); T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L. J. 943, 946 (1987).
53
See BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 97 (1993).
54
See John Finnis, Commensuration and Public Reason in INCOMMENSURABILITY,
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 215, 215 (Ruth Chang, ed., 1997);
Matthew Adler, Law and Incommensurability: Introduction, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
1169, 1170 (1998).
55
See Joseph Raz, Incommensurability and Agency, in INCOMMENSURABILITY,
INCOMPARABILITY AND PRACTICAL REASON, 110, 110-28 (Ruth Chang, ed., 1997).
56
See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 27-28.
57
See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 26-27; JOSEPH RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW 75 (1979).
58
See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L. J. 943, 946 (1987).
59
Balancing tests are a feature of, in particular, American constitutional adjudication,
and is generally defined as requiring, at the least, a comparison of the constitutional
rights protected against governmental interests. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 945 (1987); Patrick
McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REV. 585 (1988); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L.
REV. 293 (1992); Robert F. Nagel, Liberals and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 319
(1992).
60
Balancing describes “those cases in which the scales serve as the central metaphor,
and which explicitly: 1) set a balance by describing the elements to be weighed and
the legal effect of the outcome; 2) discuss those elements; and 3) declare the winner
based on the results of the balancing procedure.” Patrick M. McFadden, The
Balancing Test, 29 B. C. L. REV. 585, 596 (1988). Balancing fits with the neutral
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legal reasons conflict in commensurable manner the judge should
identify the conflicting legal reasons, determine their relative strength,
and prefer the strongest reason as determining the outcome. The judge
does not participate in setting the relative weights of the rights or
interests compared; she rather defers to the prior legislative or
constitutional assessment and simply declares the outcome.
Balancing works best in an exclusionary system of norms, where the
relative weight of the competing reasons may be determined
“artificially,”61 from the point of view of the exclusionary system.
Where the system’s norms regulate the relative strength of competing
reasons, the decision-maker may thus refuse to consider the extrasystemic weights assigned to the competing norms.
There has, however, recently emerged a vigorous debate over whether
reasons (or the values which underlie them)62 are always
commensurable inter se. Some clearly are: where commensurable
reasons conflict, indeterminacy results only if the reasons are equal in
strength, precluding any from operating as a decisive reason for
decision. A different situation, however, is presented when conflicting
reasons for action may not be measured on a single scale (of strength,

principles aspects of legal process in deferring to legal sources to determine the
outcome independent of the judge’s will. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 524 (1951) (“But how are competing interests to be assessed? Since they are
not subject to quantitative ascertainment, the issue necessarily resolves itself into
asking, who is to make the adjustment?—who is to balance the relevant factors and
ascertain which interest is in the circumstances to prevail? Full responsibility for the
choice cannot be given to the courts. Courts are not representative bodies. They are
not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society. Their judgment is best
informed, and therefore most dependable, within narrow limits. Their essential
quality is detachment, founded on independence. History teaches that the
independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the
passions of the day and assume primary responsibility in choosing between
competing political, economic and social pressures. ¶Primary responsibility for
adjusting the interests which compete in the situation before us of necessity belongs
to the Congress.”)
61
DAVID HUME, TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE II.i. (L. A. Selby-Bigge & P. H.
Nidditch, eds., 1989) (describing justice as an artificial virtue, that is, a human (rather
than natural) construct).
62
In the relationship between values and reasons, values provide grounds for reasons.
See John Gardner & Timothy Macklem, Reasons, in JULES COLEMAN AND SCOTT
SHAPIRO (EDS), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 440 (2002). A justified reason is one that identifies a value (something of
value). Some regard reasons as additional based upon desires (and not value), but as
Gardner and Macklem suggest, if our desires are subject to reason they too must pick
out something of value. Id.
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importance, etc.) and so balancing is impossible.63 Instead, the relation
between some reasons is intransitive,64 such that the conflicting reasons
remain undefeated,65 and to commensurate the reasons would be to
alter them.66 These reasons are incommensurable and “reason has no
judgment to make concerning their relative value.”67
63

It is important to proceed with caution here. Balancing depends upon a
combination of comparability, exclusion, and the presence or absence of canceling
facts. Accordingly, the fact that reasons are incomparable does not preclude
balancing. Competing reasons may be excluded from operating by the norms of the
system, or canceled from operating by some circumstance particular to the individual
case. Furthermore, as we shall see, balancing is only one of the techniques relied
upon by the American weak discretion noble dreamers; the other is the process of
“reasoned elaboration.” See HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW 143-52
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (originating phrase
“reasoned elaboration”); Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in
American Jurisprudence, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 601, 632-39 (1993) (discussing role of
reasoned elaboration within Legal Process school).
64
Intransitivity exists where A is a reason for B, and B is a reason for C, but A is not
a reason for C. For various discussions of intransitivity, see JOSEPH RAZ, MORALITY
OF FREEDOM 322, 325-326 (1988) (“A and B are incommensurate if it is neither true
that one is better than the other nor true that they are of equal value…(1) neither
[option] is better than the other, and (2) there is (or could be) another option which is
better than one but is not better than the other.”); BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE AND
LEGAL DETERMINACY 96 (1993); ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND
ECONOMICS at 55, 67-8 (1995) (adopting in part Raz’s definition); Richard A.
Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, Or Is Utility the Rule of the World?, 1995
UTAH L. REV. 683, 686 (1995) (same); and see Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth
Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy; Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism,
and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV 2121, 2148-51 2160 (1990); Cass
Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 801-802
(1994); Jeremy Waldron, Fake Incommensurability: A Response to Professor
Schauer, 45 HASTINGS L. J. 813, (1994).
65
The undefeated nature of incommensurable reasons, so prominent in John Gardner,
Justifications and Reasons, in ANDREW SIMESTER AND A.T.H. SMITH (EDS), HARM
AND CULPABILITY 103-31 (1996); & John Gardner & Timothy Macklem, Reasons, in
JULES COLEMAN AND SCOTT SHAPIRO (EDS), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 440, 470-74 (2002), is also contained in
Wiggins identification of a “remainder” and Bernard Williams pointing to some type
“residue” in choice among incommensurables.
See David Wiggins,
CHANG,
(ED.)
"Incommensurability:
Four
Proposals,"
in
RUTH
INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY AND PRACTICAL REASON, 52, 53 (1997);
Bernard Williams, Ethical Consistency, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 166, 172-77, 1825. Choice does not make the un-chosen values disappear; nor are they ranked lower
than the chosen values; nor do they change their nature. See Bernard Williams,
Ethical Consistency, at 172-77.
66
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, 115 (1980). See also JOHN
FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS, 87-88 (1983); JOSEPH RAZ, MORALITY OF
FREEDOM 339 (1986).
67
Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 324 (1986). And see id. at 334
(“Incomparability . . . marks the inability of reason to guide our action.”).
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This definition of incommensurability has three features: first,
intransitivity entails that changes in the value of one reason will not
affect its worth relative to another reason with which it is
incommensurable. There is no a “single scale of value” upon which to
measure the competing reasons.68
Second, the claim that the conflicting reasons remain undefeated entails
only that there is no decisive reason supporting a particular option, not
that there are no reasons at all. Reason has nothing more to say about
their relative value and cannot buttress the decision-maker’s preference.
If reason is to play a part in the choice, it is not by demonstrating which
option overrides the others independent of the chooser’s will, but by
generating judgment or insight in choosing among the various options,
perhaps by providing further justifications for whichever choice is
selected. Such reasons do not demonstrate that the rejected options
were wrong: rather the rejected options remain as undefeated, justified
alternatives to the current decision.69
Third, the requirement that comparison transforms the options renders
comparison, not so much illegitimate, as loaded. Changing the value of
the various options, or the system of reasoning used to validate them, to
render them comparable requires justification, and the new way of
valuing requires explanation and invites comparison with the old. To
commensurate incommensurables, in other words, is not to remove the
decision-maker’s preference, but to express it.70
Where reasons conflict and are undefeated, justification fails in a
particular way. It is not that there is no justification whatsoever for a
particular outcome, but that there is no reason to prefer one outcome
over another. There is no one “right” answer, but multiple right
answers. In such circumstances, because there are no reasons that
clinch the argument either way, the agent may choose among the
competing options without acting contrary to reason.
C. Raz’s Weak Discretion
Raz acknowledges that strong discretion is a permissible basis for
decision where undefeated reasons conflict.71 He rejects, however,
68

JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 111-18 (1980).
The are available as the source of regret or recrimination if the choice was
sufficiently moral and consequential.
70
See JOSEPH RAZ, MORALITY OF FREEDOM 327 (1986).
71
See Joseph Raz, The Relevance Of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273, 312 (1992),
reprinted in JOSPEH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995).
69
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capricious choice as an option for judges, and instead proposes a theory
of weak discretion for judicial decision-making.. The question then
becomes why conflicts of undefeated legal norms permit capricious
decision for lay decisions-makers, but not for judicial ones.
I shall suggest that Raz’s theory is remarkably similar both to
Dworkin’s and the Legal Process’ concept of reasoned elaboration as a
process of principled decision-making, an account that is at the heart of
the Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity.72 Dworkin’s theory depends
on the claim that there is “one right answer” to every legal problem,
and latterly, that the one answer that constitutes the “best”
reconstruction of the law given the judge’s theory of political morality
in light of the cases “fit” with pre-existing law.73
Like Dworkin, Raz requires the judge to decide on the basis of a
decisive, or “best” reason, and that Raz believes that morality and
doctrinal reasons have a tie-breaking role to play in determining which
outcome to choose. In fact, like Dworkin, Raz embraces a theory of
coherence or fit, albeit a limited one, to determine how to decide when
morality fails. It will turn out that both Raz and Dworkin are similar in
this way to the Legal Process school, including its more conservative
manifestations. To develop this argument, I shall first consider Raz on
weak discretion, or what he calls reasoning according to law.
1. Gaps and Discretion
Raz believes that legal reasoning can be split into two distinct forms:
(1) reasoning about the law, and (2) reasoning according to law.74 In
reasoning about the law, legal rules and standards are sufficient to
determine completely the outcome. The case is decisively regulated by
the legal norms, which means that the judge need only apply them to
generate the outcome. Where, however, the law runs out, judges are
required to indulge in something more than technical legal reasoning in
deciding what to do, “where [in other words] they have … discretion[,]
they ought to resort to moral reasoning to decide whether to use it and
how.”75

72

See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, 225-75 (1986).
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, 230-31 (1986).
74
“[R]easoning according to law, is — arguably — applying moral considerations.”
Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIS 1, 7 (1993),
reprinted in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995).
75
See Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIS, 1, 10
(1993), reprinted in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995).
73
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Often, a judge can decide a case without having to consider its moral,
social, or political merits. Here the rules of the legal system fully
govern the outcome. The judge need only indulge in a technical form of
reasoning that, first, identifies which rules apply to the instant case and,
second, how these rules apply.76 Here, the court is seen in its
applicative or declarative role, and its reasoning depends primarily
upon determining the respective legal strengths of the legal authorities
independent of the moral, social, or political value of their content.77
Following Raz, we may call this sort of reasoning “reasoning about the
law.”78
Positivists believe that, on occasion, legal rules or standards fail to
provide a determinate outcome in a particular case.79 For example,
legal rules or standards may conflict such that no outcome is required
or completely determined by the law.80 Here there is a legal gap. The
judge must either turn to standards “outside” the law or simply pick
between the various legally justified options.

76

Because a content-independent closure rule determines which legal reason for
decision prevails, or identifies a legal permission which the judge can use to close a
legal gap.
77
It may also include situations in which a global, system-wide closure rule operates,
e.g., what is not legally prohibited is legally permitted. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW 75-77 (1979).
78
See Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIS, 1, 10
(1993), reprinted in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995).
79
This failure is a consequence of the a central tenet of legal positivism: the sources
thesis. The sources thesis holds that laws are valid by virtue of their pedigree. A
reason is a legal reason because it can be derived, by procedures recognized as valid
by the appropriate legal institutions, from sources that the institutions recognize as
valid sources of law. Legal determinacy exists when the sources of law provide a
clear, mandatory outcome; indeterminacy exists when the outcome required by the
sources is unclear. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW at 49-50 (“[T]he law on a
question is settled when legally binding sources provide its [the question's] solution.
In such cases judges are typically said to apply the law…If a legal question is not
answered by standards deriving from legal sources then it lacks a legal answer—the
law on the question is unsettled.”). Raz’s version of the sources thesis claims that
sources are the grounds from which legal reasons may be derived, that such reasons
can conflict, and that where the sources fail to resolve the outcome of such a conflict,
a gap exists. Id. at 65.
80
See John Gardner, Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J.L.
STUD. 457-58 (1988). Gardner points out that Raz’s definition of a legal gap is
ambiguous as between cases in which the law requires a particular result and one in
which the law provides a complete solution to a case. In the latter instance, the law
may provide a range of permissible outcomes but, due to incommensurability, fail to
determine which among them is to prevail. Whether this latter situation ought to
count as a gap is discussed, infra at Section IV.
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Legal gaps arise because legal systems claim to be closed,
comprehensive systems of norms: they assert the power to settle
disputes even when their rules do not clearly apply to the situation at
hand. In other words, there may be cases in which the norms of the
legal system purport to guide behavior but fail to apply in a decisive
manner. None of the proposed decisions are uniquely required by the
rules of the legal system: something more is needed.81 How an agent is
to comply with the law is left indeterminate by the rules of the legal
system and, if the agent is to be guided by reasons, as opposed to
whim,82 some further non-legal reason is required to enable the
application of the legal rules to the given case.83
There are three potential ways in which to resolve a legal gap. First,
extra-legal standards may provide a determinate answer to the legal
issue.84 Second, where extra-legal standards are also indeterminate, the
judge might simply decide which she prefers. Or third, the judge might
use her “judgment,” without considering extra-legal reasons, to
determine that one of the competing options should prevail.85 Raz
endorses the first option, John Gardner the third, whereas I believe that,
on occasion, the judge may rely on personal preference. I shall first
consider Raz’s gap-filling arguments.
2. Raz and the Moral Nature of Extra-Legal Reasoning
Raz’s goal is to demonstrate that courts can be bound to follow nonlegal standards when rendering a decision. Of course, where the law is
determinate, the judge should rely upon the available legal reasons to
settle the outcome of the case. If, however, there is a gap in the law,
then the judge must select among a range of legally sanctioned options,
none of which the judge is uniquely required to apply by the operation
of some further legal reason. The legal reasons do not of themselves
determine which among the reasons ought to win out. In the absence of
a decisive reason, Raz contends, there is a legal gap.
81

Although there may be multiple permissible outcomes, all the solutions may be
legal solutions. To that extent, the law provides all the options, although it cannot
distinguish which the judge should prefer.
82
What Raz calls “taste or inclination.” See JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN 339 (1995); Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO
JURIS 1, 14 (1993), reprinted in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995).
83
We will return to whether this is in fact a legal gap at Section IV.
84
Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIS 1, 7-14 (1993),
reprinted in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995).
85
See John Gardner Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J. LEG.
STUD. 457, 457-61 (1988); Neil MacCormick, Reconstruction After Deconstruction:
A Response To CLS, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 539, 544-48 (1990).
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The judge may, however, turn to extra-legal reasons to help her
determine which legal option ought to be preferred on the balance of
reasons; the extra-legal reasons operate to “break the tie” between the
competing, undefeated reasons. This reasoning according to law is
more limited than fully fledged moral reasoning. Because the law is an
exclusionary, institutional system, not just any reason may form the
basis of a decision.86 So the standard of legal decision does not involve
considering all the possible reasons (legal and non-legal) which may
apply to the instant case, but only those extra-legal reasons which can
help the judge decide between the various legally sanctioned options: in
more technical terms, those extra-legal reasons which will determine
which of the undefeated reasons ought to prevail—this is what he
means by reasoning according to law.87
Though the scope of reasoning in such circumstances is different from
fully-fledged moral reasoning,88 nonetheless Raz believes that moral
reasons help the judge decide which, among a range of legal reasons,
ought to prevail. This he characterizes as a moral decision. That does
not permit strong discretion: what Hart calls “choice between open
alternatives.”89 Choice is limited to the valid, but non-decisive
(undefeated) legal reasons.90 The continued availability of the legal
reasons as grounds for decision is an important check upon judicial
discretion, but does not preclude “what Holmes called the ‘sovereign
prerogative of choice.’”91

86

Raz, as a positivist, considers that some are excluded from figuring in the decision
process because law is an exclusionary system of practical reasoning. See JOSEPH
RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS at 141-46.
87
JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 330-332 (1995).
88
The correct standard for legal decision is thus not “all things considered” (some
reasons are excluded) but rather the balance of reasons.
89
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127 (2d. ed. 1994).
90
H.L.A. Hart acknowledged, however, that, on occasion, judicial discretion may be
limited and weak. Where reasons are undefeated, the conflicting reasons for decision
do not simply fall away. These reasons limit the grounds of decision: they still
operate as reasons justifying decision, but do not provide a “complete” justification
requiring a unique outcome. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 204-05 (2d.
ed. 1994); see also H.L.A. Hart, Problems in the Philosophy of Law, in ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 106-07 (1983); H.L.A. Hart, American
Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, in
H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 123, 136 (1993).BRIAN
BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 26-27 (1993).
91
H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and
the Noble Dream, in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
123, 134 (1993).
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Reasoning according to law depends upon the close relationship
between law and morality.92 According to Raz, morality (1) speaks to
the same issues as does the law (I call this the Moral Overlap Thesis);93
(2) takes precedence in resolving those issues when there is a gap in the
law (I call this the Moral Supremacy Thesis);94 and (3) may provide a
closed, decisive set of reasons for decision, at least to the extent that
they cover the instant case.95 Although the law generally excludes
straightforward moral reasoning as a ground for judicial decisionmaking, that constraint disappears when legal reasons are
indeterminate. In such circumstances, moral reasons become available
as a ground for decision. If the judge is to act both legally and morally,
she ought to embrace the moral solution.
Turning to morality thus does not mean the judge has the sort of
unfettered choice characteristic of strong discretion. First, the range of
reasons the judge can consider is narrower than fully-fledged moral
reasoning because framed by the legal issues.96 Whatever decision the
judge makes will be some form of “specification” of the law in light of
the available moral reasons.97 Second, those moral reasons are there to
“break the tie”; they help decide which, among a range of legal reasons,
ought to prevail. Reasoning according to law thus requires the judge to
decide on the basis of reason: where no decisive legal reason is
available, the strongest moral reason fills the gap.98
In reasoning according to law, then, although there is a legal discretion
— the law is ambivalent as between the various possible outcomes —
there is no moral discretion. Legal discretion does not entail the sort of
free-flowing choice embodied in strong discretion. Rather, judicial
92
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Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIS 1, 8 (1993),
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RIGHTS 284 (1980); Neil MacCormick, Reconstruction After Deconstruction: A
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choice is doubly constrained: only some among the available options
are legally valid; and morality provides a decisive reason to fix which
among the available undefeated legal reasons to select.
At this point, it is worth noting that Raz’s “reasoning according to law”
presents a strong endorsement of the positivist “sources thesis”: legal
validity depends upon social sources, not merit.99 The positivist
contention is that the source-based ability to validate norms is what
differentiates law from morality.100 When reasoning according to law,
there is a legal gap, not because the judge has any choice or discretion,
but because the legal system does not provide a complete justification
of the outcome.
D. Against Preference: Raz on Doctrinal Reasons for Decision
Turning to morality does not always resolve the decision in a
determinate manner. Although moral reasons sometimes operate to fill
the legal gaps, they are not always available in this way. Problems
arise if extra-legal reasons for decision are themselves gappy.101 The
relevant moral reasons may themselves be vague and ambiguous, or
conflicting and incommensurate. That is, moral indeterminacy may
match legal indeterminacy. When both legal and moral reasons run
out, there is no way to decide on the basis of a decisive reason, moral or
otherwise. The judge would appear to be able to choose as she wishes
among the available legal options, based on nothing more than
preference alone. The judge possesses strong discretion.
Raz distrusts capricious judicial decision-making even when legal
indeterminacy is matched by moral indeterminacy. He suggests two
reasons for not relying on preference: a political reason and a
coherence-based reason. The political reason is to assure the public
that judge is either neutral or following some set of institutional rules,
so that, even although the judge is deciding according to law but
without moral guidance, she is nonetheless acting in her institutional
capacity.102
99

John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5 1/2 Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 199-202
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The coherence reason responds to the public’s demand for shared,
predictable rules of law. In a modern, municipal legal system, the law
seeks to govern large numbers of people through shared standards of
conduct applicable without further direction.103 While capricious
decisions may be able to guide the behavior of small numbers of people
in direct contact with the norm-setting authority, they are unable to
coordinate large numbers of people, particularly in atomistic
societies.104 Accordingly, some institutional, shared, and predictable
standard of decision is required. Capricious decision risks being
sufficiently random to undermine this feature of law.105
This applicative model of adjudication, though subject to different
expressions and assaults, forms the central case of decision “according
to law.”106 Such a view fits comfortably within most modern liberal
trends in legal political theory, and receives its strongest modern
expression in the Legal Process school,107 and Dworkin’s “right
answer” thesis.108 These envisage the law of modern, liberal legal
sense only if what is valued actually is valuable. They are thus not reasons in
themselves, merely endorsements of (independently existing) values or goods.
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM at 140. Accordingly, to avoid relying
upon her legally arbitrary personal taste, preference or inclination — the judge’s
values rather than the law’s — the judge should base her decision upon doctrinal
reasons if she is to decide in a manner faithful to her role as a judge. Raz suggests
that “it may be unacceptable that [the judge's] private tastes should determine rules
about duties of disclosure of information in contract formation, or standards of care
in negligence. If so, we need an artificial system of reasoning which could help
determine cases where natural reason runs out, thus assuring the public that decisions
are no mere expression of personal preference on the part of judges.” JOSEPH RAZ,
ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN at 339.
103
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104
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11-16 (1959). See also Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the
Supreme Court at October Term, 1934, 49 HARV. L. REV. 68, 90-91, 94-96 (1935).
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systems as a system of general rules or standards applicable to a
multiplicity of cases in a more-or-less determinate manner. The source
and scope of judicial authority to decide cases rests, at bottom, upon the
principles or values underlying the social order of which the
government, and in particular the judiciary, is a part.
I shall first consider Raz’s rejection of preference before comparing it
to the Legal Process and Dworkin’s discussion of adjudication.
1. Raz Against Preference
Raz asserts that two specific types of indeterminacy in particular are
likely to render law and morality gappy, requiring a turn to doctrinal
reasons: (1) social and (2) moral pluralism.109
“Social
pluralism…is…the existence of a plurality of inconsistent views on
moral, religious, social and political issues in democratic (and in many
other) societies.”110 Local coherence, the attempt to make sense of
apparently conflicting doctrine by organizing it under some governing
value or set of values,111 prevents too much unpredictability or change
among the governing legal values destabilizing the legal system.
Where selecting some extra-legal organizing principle threatens too
radical a change in legal doctrine, the judge should generally resist the
temptation to engage in a broad-ranging reconstruction of the law
rather than a local reform of legal doctrine. Local coherence has
institutional value, even if the result is morally inferior than broad
reform.112
According to Raz, when confronted with social pluralism, local
coherence requires us to use legal values as way of organizing social
values. Within an area of doctrine, the judge must consider the legal
rule, not in isolation, but as tending to organize or “make sense of” a
particular aspect of the law. She should then select that rationalization
which fits best within the relevant corpus of legal materials, rather than
109

A third situation in which considerations of local coherence have value for
judicial decision-making exists when some distinct and determinate moral value is
enshrined as a legal value. Because the value is itself coherent, judges should apply
it consistently and coherently when working out its ramifications in the law. When
institutionalizing this type of moral value, anything other than local coherence would
be morally sub-optimal. Joseph Raz, The Relevance Of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV.
273, 309-14 (1992), reprinted in JOSPEH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1995).
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simply expressing her preference for one outcome over another. Intralegal considerations of “fit” and “making sense” thus substitute for
straightforward moral reasons or judicial caprice.113
Moral pluralism suggests that moral values may conflict in a manner
that precludes reducing distinct and competing values to a single scale.
Where small numbers of people are involved, “there is no moral
objection to adopting any of the mixes which are not ruled out as
inferior. People simply do what they like, choosing in accordance with
their personal taste.”114 Where, however, larger numbers are affected,
some relatively coherent scheme of social organization is valuable to
co-ordinate a given range or type of activity.115 Local coherence
enables institutions regulate general social behavior by ensuring shared,
predictable standards of conduct.
Social and moral pluralism suggest that local coherence has particular
value, then, when the judge is confronted with conflicts between
incommensurable and so undefeated reasons. In such circumstances,
Raz appears to believe that, if the judge cannot be right, she might at
least be orderly. Local coherence enables the judge to order decisions
based upon autonomous and institutional legal values rather than moral
values or judicial caprice. Coherence forces her to look backwards at
the law as it is and at legal doctrine and to use them as the source of
legal decision.
Raz produces, in effect, a pragmatic and consequentialist argument in
favor of judicial conservatism. Faced with the prospect of unsettling
the public’s established expectations through too sudden and too global
a change, the judge ought to stop and defer to legal doctrine, even if so
doing is morally suboptimal.116
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Raz’s concern with the limits of the judicial role in a democratic
society also provides a point of contact with the Legal Process school.
He shares their concern that the judge should not attempt too much due
to lack of information about the potential consequences and lack of
institutional competence to take responsibility should things not work
out as planned. Judges should not, consciously or accidentally,
destabilize the law where morality is indeterminate.
Two features of the Legal Process movement are relevant here: the
claim that judges should rely on “neutral principles”117 as a function of
their adjudicative role; and the use of “reasoned elaboration” to
determine which principles ought to win out in the absence of a legally
sanctioned decisive principle.118
As Brian Bix notes, “‘neutral principles’ was an effort to find constraint
and legitimacy in judicial decisionmaking, which had been attacked as
being (inevitably) political and result-oriented.”119 According to
Herbert Wechsler, neutral principles preclude judicial caprice by
providing “criteria that can be framed and tested as an exercise of
reason and not merely as an act of willfulness or will.”120 Rather than
indulging their personal preferences, judges are required to rely upon
pre-existing, legislated (and in the context of constitutional
interpretation, constitutional) values.121 The legislature thus determines
the relative weight of the different values, rendering them
commensurable. The principle technique for applying such values is

made law from reaching the same conclusions, or having the same sweep, as
legislated law.
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some form of balancing test, which simply declares which of the
reasons proves decisive in this case.122
The Legal Process school exemplified H.L.A. Hart’s “Noble Dream” of
fully determinate adjudication in which the court is constrained to
operate only in its applicative or adjudicative role. The striking
similarity between Raz and Legal Process suggests that Raz participates
in a positivist version of the “Noble Dream.” Both are motivated by
the search for some decisive reason as an alternative to the
“Nightmare” of private, arbitrary adjudication that they take capricious
decision to entail.
Perhaps more intriguing is the similarity of aspects of Raz’s theory of
adjudication to Ronald Dworkin’s.123 Though Raz and Dworkin
disagree about where the line between legal and extra-legal
justifications is to be drawn,124 they both agree that decisive moral
reasons constrain judicial discretion, and that, on occasion,
considerations of coherence do so too (although they disagree over the
extent to which the law may be represented as coherent). Furthermore,
to the extent that they agree about the form and function of adjudication
as a predominantly applicative enterprise, they do so for similar
underlying reasons. They both believe that neutrality and predictability
require some sort of public — Dworkin would call it principled125 —
style of decision-making to respect the democratic nature of the judicial
process.
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III. REJECTING RAZ’S RETURN TO DOCTRINALISM
So far, I have suggested that Raz shares with certain American theories
of adjudication the belief that a decisive reason can ensure that judicial
decisions are free from caprice, that is, the personal preference of the
judge, or what Oliver Wendell Holmes called “the sovereign
prerogative of choice.”126 For Raz, as for Dworkin and the Legal
Process school, personal preference undermines the judge’s
institutional role and militates against predictable, neutral, transparent
decision-making. Accordingly, if the judge is to remain within her
predominantly applicative role127 and simply declare the law, she must
identify some decisive reason, whether legal, moral, or doctrinal, that
resolves the case.
Social and moral pluralism place the judge in a predicament. In either
circumstance, the available legal and moral values are conflicting and
incommensurable and cannot provide a decisive reason for decision.128
The only option, Raz suggests, is to turn back to the law to seek some
form of determinate outcome.129 Doctrinal or formalist legal values
provide the only remaining legitimate source of decisive reasons upon
which to base institutional choice.
Raz’s belief that doctrinal reasons operate to close legal-moral
indeterminacy appears to conflict with his claim that where the law is
indeterminate and formalist reasons conflict with moral ones, then
moral reasons should win out. Formalism, as a theory of adjudication,
126

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, in O.W. HOLMES,
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My claim is that he seeks to constrain the legislative role by requiring the judge to
rely upon decisive moral or doctrinal reasons where legal reasons runs out.
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“[T]he return from morality, when asked for its contribution to the issue at hand,
is that it has no guidance to give.” All we have left is judicial caprice; it seems like
“the return from morality is that whatever we decide to do becomes the right thing to
do.” JOSPEH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 335 (1995). Where the law is
concerned, Raz believes, “it may be unacceptable that people when acting as judges
should simply express their will, their inclination or taste in favoring one solution
over another.” Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, 6 RATIO JURIS, 1,
14 (1993).
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“Doctrinal reasons, reasons of system, local simplicity and local coherence,
should always give way to moral considerations when they conflict with them. But
the[ doctrinal reasons] have a role to play when natural reason runs out.” JOSPEH
RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 335 (1995). That role is to take the place of
personal preference and to provide an institutional reason for decision when both
legal and moral reasons are incommensurable.
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is an attempt to prescribe how judges ought to decide gappy cases: it
holds that, even although the legal reasons underdetermine the result of
a case, nonetheless the judge ought not to turn outside the law to extralegal reasons.130 Instead, the judge should rely upon some legal
principle or wait for the legislature to resolve the issue.
Where the relevant rule, taken in isolation, fails to generate a unique
outcome, the interaction of similar rules in the area of law at issue may
reveal or generate a doctrinal structure and purpose inherent in that
body of law. Relying on such formalistic or doctrinal reasons has the
advantage of preserving the institutional values of predictability and
neutrality, and promotes public, institutional, decisive reasons over
private or extra-legal reasons for decision. Formalism has costs, of
course.
It encourages rigidity and insensitivity to particular
circumstances.
Furthermore, because formalism excludes
consideration of extra-legal reasons, it leads to morally sub-optimal
outcomes.131
Raz rejects formalism as a means of resolving legal indeterminacy
where morality is determinate, but embraces formalism, or something
like it, where incommensurable conflicts among legal reasons are
matched by moral incommensurability. I shall first examine the
reasons for rejecting formalism, and then those for re-embracing it in
the presence of moral indecisiveness, before proposing a three-fold
critique of that re-embrace.
A. Formalism as a Preference-Excluding Device
Formalist reasons operate in the presence of a legal gap. They thus
compet with moral reasons for decision. But formalism expressly
rejects relying upon moral reasons to decide a case: the only reasons
that count are legal reasons. It thus conflicts with Raz’s belief in the
prmacy of morality where legal reasons no longer exclude the operation
of moral reasons. The point of reasoning according to law is that moral
130
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reasons can bind judges. Morality does so by covering the same
ground as law and providing a more compelling basis for decision, all
things considered.
In the face of a legal gap, where formalist reasons conflict with moral
reasons, the prinacy of morality entails the rejection of formalism.
Reasoning according to law mandates choosing the legally correct
outcome that comports with the morally correct outcome.132 Unless
formalist reasons coincidentally comport with moral ones, they will not
generate the correct outcome. Legal doctrine is never an appropriate
basis for filling the gap unless it supports the outcome that is morally
best on the balance of moral reasons.
Formalism thus does no work where morality is determinate. If (1)
there is a legal gap, and (2) the scope of morality and law overlap at
this point, and (3) morality determines what is the best outcome, on the
balance of reasons, then where formalist and moral reasons conflict,
moral reasons defeat formalist reasons. On the other hand, where
formalism comports with morality and identifies (by luck or design) a
moral reason for the outcome, it is redundant. We would be better off
(things are simpler, quicker, and more appropriately motivated)
immediately turning to morality to determine what is morally best.
Raz suggests that formalism does, however, have a role to play in the
face of capricious decision, and for the same reason that it is redundant
when decisive moral reasons are available. Raz’s primary worry is
personal preference expressed through capricious choices among
available options. To avoid basing her decision upon her personal taste
or inclination, the judge must substitute some decisive reason for
breaking the deadlock. Where legal rules and moral reasons both fail to
generate a determinate outcome, considerations of local coherence and
consistency may generate a determinate resolution of the case.
The idea that formalist or doctrinal reasons can adjudicate between
competing outcomes faces three potential objections. First, doctrinal
reasons may themselves be gappy, and so, logically, preference may
come into play even after considering legal rules, morality, and the
underlying principles and purposes of a legal system (or of law more
generally).133
132
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Second, Raz may consider that morally excluded institutional reasons
may return to figure as a basis for decision where morality proves
indecisive. Thus, doctrinal reasons that were overridden or excluded
by moral ones in the face of a legal gap reappear when
incommensurable conflicts render morality unable to provide a decisive
reason for decision. My claim is that the moral reasons do not drop out
of consideration simply because they are indecisive: these reasons
continue to operate to override or exclude the doctrinal reasons. Rather
than relying on otherwise sub-optimal reasons, the judge should choose
among the optimal reasons in rendering decision, even if her ultimate
choice expresses her preference rather than some objective standard of
decision.
Third, Raz might believe that doctrine has a creative role to play where
legal and moral reasons are indeterminate. Rather than “finding”
doctrine, the judge’s duty is to generate it. The doctrinal imperative
operates to ensure that the judge justify the outcome using only
institutional reasons and so avoid non-institutional justifications. The
judge’s duty is thus independently to generate some doctrinal resolution
of the legal and moral conflict without turning outside the law. She
must re-interpret the law upon the assumption that some decisive
doctrinal reason can justify the outcome in the case. If this is the role
of doctrine, however, predictability suffers. There is no decisive
advance reason for believing one (version of) doctrine will override
another — or perhaps even what the doctrine will be.
The only remaining justification for endorsing doctrine as a closure
device would be that it relies upon public and neutral reasons. If
preference does so too, then doctrine does not trump preference: in fact,
I shall show that there are good reasons to believe the opposite is true.
1. The Return of Morally Excluded Doctrinal Reasons
Raz appears to consider that the doctrinal reasons do not simply fall
away, but come back into consideration after moral reasons prove
indeterminate. That is, where morality is indecisive, doctrinal reasons
fail to be “trumped” by any moral reasons, and so figure in legal
reasoning all the time. The legal reasons have not run out: at least
some of them operate to decide the outcome when moral reasons fail.
He makes it clear that “[d]octrinal reasons, reasons of system, local
determinate legal, moral, or doctrinal resolution, but nonetheless trivial, altering the
rights of only the parties, or a few individuals, or settling a relatively unimportant
question of law.
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simplicity and local coherence, should always give way to moral
considerations when they conflict with them. But they have a role to
play when natural reason runs out.”134 That role is to take the place of
personal preference and to provide an institutional reason for decision
when both legal and moral reasons are incommensurable.
How do reasons that could not cure a legal incommensurability before
we turned to moral reasons do so after we have turned to moral reasons
and found them insufficient (not, it should be noted, absent)? Raz
suggests that there is no conflict in this sort of situation: that doctrinal
reasons are decisive just because moral indeterminacy renders them
unopposed, and so there is no reason that could defeat them.135 I
suggest that this view is mistaken. Just because the moral reasons do
not provide a decisive reason for decision does not mean that they
somehow fail to conflict with doctrinal reasons: “running out” does not
mean “disappear.” Moral reasons are still present, they just fail to
recommend one, unique option.
Raz’s appears to believe that, where morality is indecisive, the turn to
morality has sent us down a blind alley and so we must make do with
the law. “[T]he return from morality, when asked for its contribution to
the issue at hand, is that it has no guidance to give.”136 All we have left
is judicial caprice; it seems like “whatever we decide to do becomes the
right thing to do.”137 The return from morality is not, however,
negligible: it is only indecisive. Moral reasons have overridden or
excluded legal reasons: the legal reasons do not suddenly become
morally acceptable just because morality is indecisive. Morality has
not exhausted itself in this way.
Doctrinal reasons are not decisive just because other moral reasons are
indecisive. Undefeated but indecisive moral reasons for decision may
still be stronger than the doctrinal alternatives. That is, the fact that a
reason does not outweigh every other reasons is not a barrier to it being
weightier than some other reasons. According to reasoning according
to law, non-excluded moral reasons outweigh doctrinal reasons when
they conflict. This will not change simply because the moral reasons
conflict with other moral reasons and are incommensurable with them.
Accordingly, the same argument that justified the turn to morality in
preference to formalism when legal reasons proved gappy prevents
134
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returning to formalism when moral reasons fail to produce a decisive
outcome. The moral reasons are not cancelled just because they are
incommensurable and indecisive.
Doctrine provides no new
information about the relative strength of the reasons: it is not the case
that their relative strength has changed.
Where moral reasons have attached, although the legal, moral, and
doctrinal reasons are fragmented, the move from moral reasons to
doctrinal reasons appears particularly capricious given the AngloAmerican legal system’s tradition of rational justification. In such legal
systems, it is usual for the judge to give reasons that explain or justify
her decision. In a situation in which there are no decisive reasons for
favoring one decision over the other, the judge may have to make her
decision palatable to the losing side by advancing whatever
justificatory reasons she can. These may indeed be technical, doctrinal
reasons. But the use of such reasons may be the means by which the
judge signals to the parties that there was no decisive reason which
determined the outcome: case was a close one, some decision had to be
made, and in the end she judged that this would be the better outcome.
Once the judge has started to consider moral reasons, then simply to
argue that these reasons no longer apply and that technical legal
considerations ought to decide the issue appears to be an evasion of the
issues.138 Deciding on the basis of technical reasons may itself be
considered a partial and prejudiced manner of deciding the issue,
especially as such considerations are innately conservative, favoring the
status quo. Where, however, the court’s primary institutional role is
applicative and justified by the values of predictability and neutrality,
courts should avoid engaging in unwarranted and controversial
legislation, instead favoring the status quo.
2. Incommensurable Conflicts Among Doctrinal Reasons
The most straightforward objection to Raz’s reliance on doctrinal
reasons is to suggest that they may be conflicting and incommensurable
rather than cohesive and mutually supporting. It turns out that many
theorists tend to organize areas of law around conflicting, rather than
unitary, doctrines, and I begin by giving a few examples. If doctrinal
reasons, along with the more directly applicable legal and moral
reasons, are as fragmented as is often claimed, then judicial caprice
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must operate to resolve the outcome. This is so even though all the
possible outcomes are legally valid outcomes.
Doctrinal reasons may be incommensurable. That is to say, different
systems of reasoning used to organize areas of law into coherent
chunks may overlap and compete to explain the more particular rules or
standards. For example, the basic concepts of contract law are
notoriously contradictory, some favoring communitarian values that
“channel[] and regulat[e]…market transactions according to ideals of
social justice,” others embodying market values of laissez faire by
providing “a facility for individuals to pursue their voluntary
choices.”139 Each theory purports to explain the manner in which the
law of contract is organized, and consequently the attitude of the
legislature and courts towards the point and purpose of contractual
arrangements. The two models propose to account for the values that
do or should underlie the law of contract. They offer a means by which
to gauge and critique different procedural and substantive
arrangements, but which conflict at different points and in different
ways, often providing incommensurable reasons for decision
The type of doctrinal conflict — between commensurables or
incommensurables — impacts the structure of a particular area of law.
Where the doctrines conflict in a commensurable manner, once a legal
source (a case, statute or custom) determines the relative strength of
one doctrine vis-à-vis the other, a judge can and should use that source
to identify the outcome of future conflicts. The case, statute or custom
authoritatively determines how subsequent cases are to be decided.140
To the extent that the doctrines are incommensurable, doctrinal
conflicts are “nested.”141 That is to say, conflicts between the
communitarian and laissez faire models constantly re-appear, unsettled,
in conflicts among rules or principles that embody each value (or
embody both at the same time). The outcome is not predetermined by
prior resolutions of the conflict but must be reconsidered anew on each
occasion the conflict arises.
American jurisprudence has, at significant periods, considered doctrinal
reasons to exist in a more-or-less regimented state of nested conflict.
For example, Karl Llewellyn suggested that legal doctrine existed in
conflicting canonical statements, such that each doctrinal argument
139
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could be opposed with a conflicting one.142 Duncan Kennedy
developed Llewellyn’s argument by suggesting that there are a range of
stereotyped doctrinal “argument bytes” that it is the business of the
lawyer to know and deploy. Each byte is matched by an opposite, and
both are nested, recurring throughout the law in various situations, so
that on each occasion the conflict must be resolved anew.143 A final
familiar version of this thesis is Roberto Unger’s suggestion that the
law is structured by various principles and counter-principles, such that
the judge must choose between them whenever deciding a case.144
It is not necessary to embrace Legal Realism or Critical Legal Studies
to recognize that doctrine may be indederminate. Consider, as an
example of an conflict among doctrinal reasons, Morrison v. Thoelke
145
a case of first impression concerning formation of contract. The
problem addressed by the court in Morrison is that, under the general
rules of contract formation, an offer may be revoked at any time before
its acceptance is communicated to the offeror, but not after
Communication may, however, be a temporally
acceptance.146
extended process, and where there is a lapse of time between the
sending of a revocation and its receipt, the offeree may accept the offer.
That is in fact what happened in Morrison.
Using the mails, Morrison sent Thoelke an offer for the sale of
property; the latter on receipt of the offer sent his acceptance of the
contract back through the mail to Morrison. After mailing the
acceptance, but prior to Morrison's receipt thereof, Thoelke attempted
to withdraw his acceptance of the offer. The question is whether the
acceptance had legal effect once it had been deposited in the post or
only upon receipt. The judge was faced with a clear conflict between
two legally-supported choices, neither of which was decisive.
In Morrison, there are two conflicting rules, each of which provides
persuasive legal authority for the alternative choices. The “deposited
acceptance” rule stipulates that depositing the letter in the post signifies
acceptance; another rule conceives of the post as the agent of the
sender, and delays acceptance until it is received by the offeror.
142
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Whichever rule is selected will fill a gap in the revocation-of-contract
rule, in which the term “communicated to the offeror” is vague. There
is no decisive legal answer, because this is a case of first impression
and other courts are split on the issue, as is the relevant academic
literature. There is also no moral answer. Obligation, whether legal or
moral, has not attached yet. Here legal and moral obligations cover the
same ground.
More to my point, doctrine itself is indeterminate. The Morrison court
noted that there is a persuasive academic literature surrounding the
various justifications for the different versions of the postal rule.147
Unfortunately for the judge, the academy failed to provide an
overriding reason for selecting one among the various doctrinal
justifications. The various doctrinal reasons remained undefeated
without any reason, moral, legal, or doctrinal, to break the tie.
Here balancing fails because the competing legal (and other) reasons
are of equal strength or incommensurable. No reason is decisive and
the judge must exercise a choice. Balancing, however, is only one half
of the Legal Process prescription for neutral adjudication. The other
half consists in what Legal Process scholars call the “reasoned
elaboration of purposive law.”148 Reasoned elaboration operates where
commensurability fails and balancing is impossible. It requires the
outcome to be justified by a neutral, public, participative process that
engages in, on the one hand, a technical explanation of the judge’s
institutional competence and, on the other, an exploration of the
purposes of the substantive rule or doctrine at issue, “consistent with
the other established applications of it and . . . in the way which best
serves the principles and policies it expresses.”149
The process of elaboration cannot remain neutral if the judge’s personal
preference becomes the tipping point when comparing competing
options. The whole point of reasoned elaboration is that the relevant
reasons transcend the immediate result. They are to be contrasted with
the personal political or social preferences of the judge. Accordingly,
the tie-breaking reason must derive from some neutral source, not from
willfulness or personal preference.
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Purpose serves the function of neutrality in two distinct ways. First, it
operates as a substantive criterion of any law, requiring the judge to
determine the goals it was enacted to serve given the other valid rules
and standards. In this way, purpose can operate as a form of
hypothetical testing,150 to exclude non-conforming outcomes and
remove indeterminacy over the rule’s application. Second, it operates
as a procedural criterion, such that certain styles of reasoning are
appropriate given the different roles and competencies of diverse
institutions within the law.151
In Morrison, however, after elaborating the doctrines, neither is
weightier than the other. The process of hypothetical testing has
excluded an insufficient range of options, and the judge must still pick
among them. In this case, the moral and legal issues await the judge’s
choice, rather than direct it. Reasoned elaboration takes the judge only
so far: she must still choose without some decisive reason for so doing.
For future cases, what is required is certainty: thus, all that is required
is a decision.152 Whichever reason the judge chooses will do, but she
must choose one.153 Her choice is not, however, determined by the
chosen doctrine, but endorses it.
3. The Duty to Generate Decisive Doctrinal Reasons
A final version of formalism may hold that where legal reasons prove
indecisive, and the available doctrinal organization of the rules does not
determine the outcome, then the judge should generate another version
of the doctrine, one that does resolve the issue at hand. The judge’s
duty is thus to expand or innovate doctrine in an attempt to settle the
case based upon the adjudicative imperative to decide. Here, the point
of reasoned elaboration is not to find and declare the legally mandated
outcome, but to create it.154 So long as the judge provides some neutral
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principles for the rational exposition of the law, judicial legislation may
be sufficiently determinate as to be neutral and predictable.155
Dworkin pointedly rejects incommensurability as having a role in
adjudication.156 Rather, Dworkin argues that a set of coherent legal
principles exists to settle the outcome in each case.157 For Dworkin, as
for the legal process school, the judge’s goal is to link the instant case
to the more general principles organizing the legal materials, and to use
these to generate a determinate or at least “neutral” processes by which
to resolve legal indeterminacy.
Neil MacCormick , like Joseph Raz, provides a positivist account of
judicial decision-making as that embraces incommensurability.
MacCormick attempts to accommodate the sort of “reasoned
elaboration” characteristic of the Legal Process school and the
principled decision-making propounded by Dworkin. MacCormick
adopts two of the requirements of reasoned elaboration: (1) that an
outcome be “formally just,”158 which is to say, generalizable from a
particular ruling to a more general rule or principle; and (2) that the
rule or principle identified is a legal rule or principle, or can be derived
from legal rules or principles. He too suggests that, where the law
proves indeterminate, the job of the judge is to harmonize the operative
rules with the general principles of the legal system.159 Where the
principles fail resolve the case, necessitating a choice on
consequentialist grounds, “evaluation should be made by reference to
legally appropriate values. . . [and] must be shown to be coherent with
the rest of the legal system or the relevant branch of it.”160
MacCormick is not, however, methodologically committed to
commensurability. He believes that it is perfectly possible, however,
that coherence simply will feature “weakly” or not at all in the
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justification of a particular outcome.161 There may be more than one
legally valid rationalization of the rules, so that multiple proposed rules
are perfectly coherent with legal doctrine. A choice must somehow be
made between them. That choice may be made on the basis of
consistency with prior extensions of the law or on consequentialist
grounds.
Consequentialist arguments are a means of testing possible rules by
considering how they “make sense” of both the law and the real world,
and limited to those supported by legal principle.162 On the one hand,
the judge must evaluate which rationalization fits best (rather than
merely fits) with the corpus of valid legal materials.163 On the other
hand, as with the process of reasoned elaboration, the judge tests the
impact of the rule by considering its effects in the world. The purpose
of testing is to determine which form of the proposed rule is most likely
to achieve the ends contemplated by the controlling principle.164
MacCormick thus avoids John Finnis’s critique of Dworkin’s
coherence-based theory of “law as integrity.”165 Finnis suggests that
the two values Dworkin adduces a comprising law as integrity, “fit”
and “justifiability,” are incommensurable with each other, and so no
judge can engage in the sort of balancing that Dworkin proposes would
produce a unique “best” or decisive outcome.166 MacCormick does not
seek a unique outcome: he instead proposes that judges should evaluate
the consequences of the various proposed rules. All possible outcomes
are legally justified, because based on some rule coherent with the
existing legal principles. Each outcome has a different impact on the
world. MacCormick’s point is that it is worth evaluating what that
impact is, and determining whether it is consistent with prior rulings in
that area.167 If, at the end of this process, there are multiple such

161

“[C]onsiderations of 'coherence' may be considered only weakly justifying
considerations. . . .coherence concerns the derivability of a novel decision or ruling
in law from the re-existing body of law, not the ultimate defensibility of the decision
or ruling from a moral point of view.” Neil MacCormick, Coherence In Legal
Justification, in THEORIE DER NORMEN: FESTGABE FÜR OTA WEINBERGER ZUM 65.
GEBURTSTAG , 47 (Werner Krawietz et al., eds., 1984).
162
See NEIL MACCORMICK LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 101-2 (1994).
163
See NEIL MACCORMICK LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 101-3 (1994).
164
NEIL MACCORMICK LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 150 (1994).
165
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, 225-75 (1986).
166
See John Finnis, On Reason and Authority in Law’s Empire, 6 L. & PHIL. 357,
370-76 (1987).
167
Compare JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 363 ((1986) (“where an
agent is faced with only two options and they are incommensurable … [o]ne cannot
compare the value of the options, one can only judge their value each on its own.”).

39

JUDICIAL CAPRICE
justified outcomes, the judge must pick among them.
choice remains a possibility.

Capricious

Where incommensurability exists, so does the possibility of capricious
choice.
Accordingly, to the extent doctrinal arguments are
incommensurable they fail to insulate decision from caprice. The judge
will have, at certain points, the power to decide capriciously. In certain
situations, I now argue, she will have a legal right to do so.
IV. PERMISSIONS
So far, I have suggested that there is a distinction between decisively
regulated cases, where the law resolves the conflict among reasons to
provide a uniquely required outcome, and completely-but-indecisively
regulated cases, where there are multiple legally acceptable outcomes,
but no single outcome is required.168 Here the scope of the legal
decision may be limited to selecting among the available outcomes. At
a minimum, the distinction between decisively and indecisively
regulated cases indicates the possibility that the only basis for judicial
decision is judicial caprice.
Where there is thoroughgoing
incommensurability, that is, where legal incommensurability is
matched by both moral and doctrinal incommensurability, there is no
decisive reason to dictate the outcome. The judge must exercise her
personal choice to select one among the legally valid alternatives.
In this section, I demonstrate that the legal power to choose
capriciously is matched by the legal right to do so. That right is
generated by an implied legal permission just to pick one of the
competing options — an implication that arises from the undefeated
nature of the competing reasons. When reasons are undefeated they are
converted into what I call pragmatic permissions. To show how, I shall
consider some comments by John Gardner and Raz on structure of
conflicts among reasons.
A. Express and Implied Permissions
Permissions confer the right to act, not only the ability to do so.169 An
ability is a power to change an individual’s normative status;170
168
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however, the power to change an individual’s normative status need not
entail the right to do so. For example, the doctrine of double jeopardy
confers a power upon a criminal jury: to disregard the law and reject
conviction.171 It is generally conceded, however, that the jury has no
right to nullify — no law permits nullification — and so no right to be
informed of its power.172 Hence one source of discomfort with jury
nullification: the jury appears to disregard its oath to follow the law and
illegitimately invade the authority rightfully exercised by the judge,
legislature, and prosecutor.
Permissions, on the other hand, indicate a legally-conferred right to act
in a particular manner. Permissions may be “express” (or “explicit”173)
or implied. Express permissions are exclusionary, precluding the
operation of reasons that conflict with the permitted action, as well as
providing a permission to act or not, as the agent so chooses.174 The
agent is not required to perform the act stipulated, but rather may (or
may not) perform it. So if, for example, the rules of a particular golf
course stipulate that: “If a player's golf ball lies on a path on the course,
then the player is permitted to drop the ball within one club's length of
the path,” there is then an express permission to move the ball if it lies
on the path. The player may equally well elect not to move the ball,
instead playing it from where it lies, and still conform to the rules of the
course.
Express permissions depend upon a source stating that such a
permission exists. Such permissions are not to be inferred from the
absence of reasons for action (the absence of constraint), nor are they
tied to any reason for action.175 Express reasons thus only exist in
source-based systems of reasoning.
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Implied permissions exist when there are no reasons imposing practical
constraints upon action, that is, when there are undefeated reasons to
the contrary. Raz calls these “weak” or “conclusive” permissions,176
and they exist in the absence of a clear reason for action—in law, a
clear or determinate source.
They are “conclusive” (I prefer
“decisive”) because they form the conclusion of an argument over what
sorts of reasons there are for doing a particular act. Where there are no
reasons that clinch the argument either way then there is a permission.
Raz considers that there is an implied permission where reasons of
equal strength conflict.177 Each cancels the other, transforming the
conflict from one regulated by reasons into one in which neither of the
conflicting reasons operate — a position that, it turns out, is only partly
correct.
It is worth considering in some detail the nature of implied permissions.
Because Raz believes that the conflicting reasons or equal strength
cancel each other out, he believes that these reasons disappear.178 In
such circumstances, the scope of an implied permission is constrained
only by the other norms of the system. The judge can rely on any nonexcluded reason to decide the outcome — what John Finnis would call
“‘open-ended’ practical reasoning,”179 and what Hart would call an
open choice. I believe that, where reasons or equal strength or reasons
incommensurable as to strength conflict, they are not canceled in this
way. They remain to operate as undefeated grounds for decision, and
the scope of the permission is limited to choosing among the
conflicting undefeated reasons.
1. Conflicts, Gaps, Permissions
Raz’s discussion of implied permissions depends upon the concept of
“canceling.”180 Canceling is familiar to lawyers. The classic example
is frustration of contract, and the classic case on frustration is Krell v.
Henry.181 Krell resulted from the postponement of Edward VII’s
Coronation due to the King’s appendicitis. Henry had paid Krell a
deposit to hire an apartment overlooking the route of the coronation
procession; after the procession was cancelled Henry refused to pay the
balance. Krell sued. The Court of Appeals sided with Henry, asserting
176
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that there was no breach of contract because the contract was frustrated
by “the non-existence” of the foundation of the contract, namely the
procession.182
As the frustration analogy makes apparent, canceling conditions do not
outweigh the other reasons for choice, nor do they exclude one reason
for decision. They are simply facts that makes a reason disappear from
our calculus over what to do.183
Raz considers that when reasons of equal strength conflict, the
conflicting reasons cancel each other out; they not only block each
other’s operation but disappear as reasons for action.184 There are no
longer any reasons requiring a particular decision, only an implied
permission. The judge’s discretion is not limited to choice between the
competing reasons when deciding what to do. It is not only the
conflicting outcomes that are permitted: the scope of the legal
permission is larger than that, because the conflicting reasons are
cancelled — gone — and no longer operate to constrain choice. In the
absence of regulation, anything not precluded by law is permitted.185
I propose a modification of Raz’s account of conflicts of reasons of
equal strength. To see why, consider the game of basketball. In
basketball, a reason for calling a foul on a player is that there is a
source — one of the “Rules of Basketball” produced by the National
Basketball Association, basketball’s governing body186 — for the
basketballing reason-statement that if a player holds or otherwise
impedes the progress of an opponent using her hand or forearm, then
the player has fouled the opponent.187 The source for calling the foul is
the governing body’s authoritative statement of the rules of basketball.
The rule operates as a reason requiring the official to call a foul
whenever she observes one.
Now, by the rules of basketball, only one personal foul can be called on
a given play. Nonetheless, on any given play, multiple players could
182

[1903] 2 K.B. 740, 747 (C.A.).
JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 27 (1990).
184
JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 89 (1990); JOSEPH RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW 64 (1979).
185
JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 85-89 (1990); JOSEPH RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW 75 (1979).
186
See Official Rules of the National Basketball Association at
http://www.nba.com/analysis/rules_index.html (last checked August 30, 2006).
187
See
NBA
Rule
12:
Fouls
and
Penalties
at
http://www.nba.com/analysis/rules_12.html?nav=ArticleList (last checked August
30, 2006).
183

43

JUDICIAL CAPRICE
hold or impede their opponent. Whichever happens first blocks (Raz
would say “cancels”) the later fouls from operating as a reason for
assessing a foul.188
But what happens if both events occur
simultaneously, that is, if two players foul an opponent at the same
time. There are two equally strong reasons that conflict, one for
assessing a foul on Player 1, and another for assessing a foul on Player
2. Who is to be called for the foul?
There is no reason that mandates the choice of one player over the
other. Either decision is permitted; neither is uniquely required. The
rules are indeterminate as to what is to be done, and they permit the
referee to make a choice between the conflicting options. In other
words, she has a discretion.
The referee’s discretion is, however, constrained to the available
options. It is not the case that the reason for calling the foul is
frustrated. The reasons for calling the foul — Players 1 and 2 each
fouled their opponent — do not disappear but are transformed from
decisive to undefeated reasons for decision. That is, the fact that Player
1 fouled the opponent does not override the competing reason for
calling the foul on Player 2, but is not overridden in its turn, and vice
versa.
Furthermore, the scope of the permission is limited to the competing
reasons. There are a range of other non-excluded reason she could
point to:189 that yet another person, Player 3, fouled the opponent; or
that, in the absence of a reason for calling a foul she could just let play
continue.190 Because the reasons do not disappear, however, she is
limited to relying on the fact that each player fouled the opponent, but
has no decisive reason for picking a particular player. She ought just to
“judge” between the two options in order to render her decision. But
how? She is beyond judgment here: judgment was what established the
parity of the conflicting reasons for calling simultaneous fouls.191 All
188

This is a somewhat simplified version of the rules, see See NBA Rule 12: Fouls
and Penalties at http://www.nba.com/analysis/rules_12.html?nav=ArticleList (last
checked August 30, 2006), but it will do for present purposes.
189
Excluded reasons include moral or social reasons to decide who gets the foul,
such as one of the players is a noted philanthropist, or comes from a disadvantaged
background. Furthermore, they include some gamer-related reasons, such as one
player has had a better game and should be awarded accordingly
190
In basketball, it sometimes appears that there is a customary rule that fouls are not
calls on the last few plays of a game, especially in the playoffs. That rule has not
been expressly endorsed by the National Basketball Association.
191
A further point: decision here is does not match Dworkin’s second category of
weak discretion, i.e,., that the decision is simply unreviewable. The laws of cricket
provide that this type of decision may be reviewed by a third umpire on television.
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she can do is pick one or other of the players. Her choice of player will
be capricious, and permissibly so.
B. Conflicts Among Reasons of Equal Strength
As we have seen, Raz believes that where conflicting reasons of equal
strength conflict, there is a permission. John Gardner’s view is more
difficult to discern: he states that there is an express permission to
decide among incommensurable sources in certain circumstances; but
the circumstances he cites concern commensurable sources. By
elaborating upon his examples, I shall suggest that: (1) there is an
implied
permission
where
undefeated
reasons,
whether
incommensurable or equal-and-commensurable in strength, conflict; (2)
that the existence of such permissions depends upon a modified version
of Raz’s account of conflicts among reasons of equal strength; and (3)
that the resulting permission is limited and “pragmatic” — the
underlying reasons do not disappear, but remain to limit the ensuing
range of options.
1. Permissive Sources
Gardner’s discussion of legal permissions considers the phenomenon of
permissive sources of law. A permissive source exists where there is a
conflict between intra-jurisdictional and extra-jurisdictional sources,
such that the court may rely upon either type of source.192 The
conflicting sources may be either commensurable, because they are of
comparable law-generating authority, or incommensurable, such that
comparison between the two presents significant problems.193
To suggest that sources are incommensurable is to suggest that two or
more socially identifiable entities make incompatible claims to
authority upon our practical deliberations. Gardner believes he has
identified the following example in the English legal system.194 The
English Court of Appeal is usually bound by its own previous
decisions. However, where such a decision conflicts with a decision of
However, because the reasons for given each batsman out are in equipoise, review
will not remove discretion
192
John Gardner Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD.
457, 457-60 (1988).
193
Permissive sources may also be express or implied. An express permission exists
where the jurisdiction has enacted a norm allowing the court to rely upon either type
of source. An implied permission exists where two commensurable and equally
authoritative sources conflict.
194
John Gardner Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD.
457, 459-60 (1988).
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the Privy Council, the Court of Appeal may follow a Privy Council
decision. Here there are multiple sources for decision (the different
courts, with their ability to generate binding legal norms) and on
occasion those sources may conflict over what counts as the correct
reason for decision (they establish different precedents). Gardner treats
such sources as incomparable.”195
Gardner’s assertion that these sources — the Court of Appeals as
compared to the Privy Council — are incommensurable seems, without
more, odd on its face.196 Incommensurability consists in the inability to
weigh and rank the competing options.197 To commensurate the
options would transform the nature of the source to be commensurated.
But there is no evidence that the Court of Appeals regards its own
precedent-setting authority and that of the Privy counsel in this way.198
Instead, these sources are not differently (incommensurably)
authoritative, but rather of equal authority.
Consider another example of expressly permissive sources, this time
from the American legal system: the doctrine of intra-court comity, “a
rule that generally dictates that judges of coordinate jurisdiction should
follow brethren judges' rulings on identical issues.”199 The doctrine
applies at the federal trial-court level, such that a district court judge
may consider the decisions of her trial-court colleagues in a particular
district or circuit, but is not bound by them.200 This type of permission
appears identical to the sort contemplated by Gardner, and represents a
conflict between sources that the doctrine of intra-court comity
identifies as equally authoritative and commensurable.

195

John Gardner Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD.
457, 459 (1988). While Gardner, following Thomas Nagel, The Fragmentation of
Value, reprinted in MORTAL QUESTIONS 128 (1979), calls such conflicts
“incomparable,” I prefer the more accurate term “incommensurable.”
196
I happen to think that Gardner is wrong here. His mistake is a result of Raz's
argument that there is no legal gap where permissions conflict. RAZ, AL at 75-76.
Gardner wishes to argue that there is a gap, and so he assumes that the sources are
simply incommensurable, rather than of equal strength.
197
“A and B are incommensurate if it is neither true that one is better than the other
nor true that they are of equal value.” JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM
322 (1986). This statement concerns incommensurability as to value, but could
easily be reformulated to provide a definition of incommensurability as to strength.
198
See Worcester Works Finance Ltd. v. Cooden Eng. Co. Ltd. [1972] 1 Q.B. 210,
217.
199
American Silicon Technologies v. United States, 261 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed Cir.
2001).
200
Fishman & Tobin, Inc. v. Tropical Shipping & Construction Co., Ltd., 240 F.3d
956, 965 (11th Cir. 2001) (“While the decisions of their fellow judges are persuasive,
they are not binding authority.”).
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2. Implied Permissive Sources
According to Gardner, the type of gap generated by a permissive source
derives from an express permission. I suggest in instead that the sort of
discretion Gardner contemplates can result from an implied permission.
Furthermore, it does not matter whether the conflicting legal reasons
are equal in strength or incommensurable: so long as they are
undefeated the judge possesses a permission to pick among them to
resolve the case.
Judges may have an implied permission to consider a range of sources
of law based on the existence of an implied permission. The United
States federal court system is a two-tier system of geographically
divided inferior federal courts in which each federal circuit court of
appeals equally authoritative as any other. Each circuit court is able to
create binding precedent only in its own jurisdiction; such precedent
does not bind the courts of sister circuits.201
In any given circuit, where there is no applicable precedent, each of the
other federal courts of appeal constitutes an equally authoritative source
of law. Where the sister court precedents conflict, choice among them
depends upon an implied permission: each source is of equal strength,
and none overrules the other. Accordingly, each federal court of
appeals has an implied permission to use its sister-courts’ precedents
where its own precedents fail to determine the outcome of a case and
the sister courts’ precedents conflict.
If a court in the First Circuit lack an authoritative intra-circuit
precedent, it could, of course, turn to morality as easily as turning to
sister circuit precedents. Nonetheless, the major difference between the
other circuits’ precedents and moral considerations is that extra-circuit
precedents identify the solutions that have been reached in comparable
jurisdictions. A persuasive source thus provides a concrete example of
hypothetical testing, sharing the same sort of subject matter and
standards of reasoning as the First Circuit, and showing the
consequences for legal doctrine in a similar legal regime and
consequences for the same general society. The court may then
compare such consequences to the hypothetical impact of other, nonlegal reasons on the balance of reasons.
Extra-circuit sources provide a judge with a legal way to resolve a gap
in the law. They are often adverted to by courts, especially when faced
201

See Judicial Code of 1948, Chapter 3; see also Supreme Court Rule 10 (reason for
granting certiorari is splits among circuit courts.)

47

JUDICIAL CAPRICE
with cases of first impression featuring issues that have been addressed
in other jurisdictions. Recognizing that conflicts among equal-andcommensurable reasons generate permissions demonstrates how such
permissions operate as a to avoid potential indeterminacies. Where
there is an express permission to resolve intra-jurisdiction
indeterminacy by considering equally authoritative sources, that
permission enables the judge to evaluate what is going on around her
and to rely upon her fellow judges’ decisions. There may also be an
express permission to consider extra-jurisdictional sources, as when the
English Court of Appeals may consider the European Convention on
Human Rights in certain circumstances.202
Furthermore, there may be an implied permission to choose among
conflicting, equally strong extra-jurisdictional sources.
Such a
permission permits uniformity or comity in the substantive law of
related or abutting (but nonetheless distinct) jurisdictions. The court
can avoid conflict with those jurisdictions or, where there is conflict,
consider which has the best set of arguments on the merits. There is no
need to turn to open-ended practical reasoning.203
3. Nesting
So far, in considering both express and implied permissions, I have
considered conflicts between equally authoritative sources of law.
Conflicts between sources equal in strength manifest none of the
fragmentation of value that Gardner is concerned about. Because the
conflicting reasons are commensurable, the outcome is “on the same
plane” whichever reason is preferred. Here there is no change in the
mode of evaluation after a decision rendered. The scope of the
permission is limited to relying on one or other of the legal sources as a
ground of decision. This would appear to comport with Gardner’s
description of weak discretion, picking one or other reason without
considering further moral, political, or pragmatic justifications.204
There are, however, some features of the conflict between the Court of
Appeal and Privy Counsel that do appear to mimic conflicts between
incommensurable reasons. In particular, the resolution of any one

202

See John Gardner Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J. LEG.
STUD. 457, 458 (1988).
203
See John Gardner Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J. LEG.
STUD. 457, 458 (1988).
204
See John Gardner Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J. LEG.
STUD. 457, 458 (1988).
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conflict does not establish that one source is more authoritative than the
other for future conflicts: the conflict remains “nested.”205
Nesting generally describes the ability of reasons to retain their strength
even though defeated in particular circumstances. Thus, although in
one situation reason A may have defeated reason B, if the conflict
between those reasons is nested, the relative strength of the reasons
must be re-decided whenever that conflict arises again. Thus, where
conflict is nested, a particular resolution in one part of the system may
always be reviewed and changed when it re-appears in another part of
the system.
Parity between the sources, however, explains the reason why: choice
between the sources fails to establish a hierarchy for subsequent cases.
Establishing such a hierarchy would remove discretion because the
superior source would defeat the inferior. Maintaining the sources in
equipoise without resolving their conflict retains the discretion to use
one or other source. Thus, despite the availability of the Privy
Counsel’s decisions, in a case of first impression, to fill a gap or, where
its decision conflicts with a pre-existing precedent of the Court of
Appeal, change the law, we learn nothing new about the system’s
structure, because the competing sources continue to operate as
available alternatives.
Resolving the conflict among permissive sources does render more
determinate the substantive law. Once the outcome is settled, then the
doctrinal issue is determined for the future because the Court of
Appeals has chosen which rule to follow in these circumstances. The
Court has not, however, settled which is the more authoritative source.
The sources remain in equipoise should their precedents diverge on
other issues.
Such an option is important for the English legal system as a pressure
valve, permitting the Court of Appeals to reconsider its past decisions.
The case is regulated if it conforms to past precedent, but precedent is
defeasible dependant upon the available permissive sources.206

205

“‘[N]esting’ [is] . . . the reproduction of the of particular argumentative
oppositions within the doctrinal structures that apparently resolve them.” Duncan
Kennedy, A Semiotics Of Legal Argument, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75, 112 (1991); see
also id. at 112-116; J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669 (1990)
(book review).
206
See Richard H.S. Tur, Defeasibilism, 21 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 355, 359 (2001)
(defeasibility entails that “the defeating consideration impacts only upon the result
but not on the rule. Th[e] . . . rule . . . remains intact and available to be applied
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Gardner’s example of permissive sources thus depends upon the
presence of a source — the Court of Appeal, which has the power to
bind itself — generating the express permission to consider the Privy
Counsel as an alternative source of precedent. This device enables the
Court of Appeal to change tack without having to overrule itself or
await overruling from a higher court. The rule of intra-court comity
also functions as an express permission, allowing a judge to conform
her decisions to those of her colleagues.
This, incidentally, is at odds with one way of interpreting H.L.A. Hart’s
account of the consequences of judicial decision in penumbral cases.
Hart suggests that:
When the unenvisaged case does arise, we confront the issues
at stake and can then settle the question by choosing between
the competing interests in the way which best satisfies us. In
doing so we shall have rendered more determinate our initial
aim, and shall incidentally have settled a question as to the
meaning, for the purposes of this rule, of a general word.207

Here, Hart appears to indicate that the core is essentially expanding,
reaching out to provide determinate guidance because the court’s
decision resolves the legislative indeterminacy. Of course, legislation
may introduce new indeterminacies, and this is as true for judicial as
for Congressional or Parliamentary legislation. Where, however, courts
confront some indeterminacy, however, Hart suggests that their
decision resolves it.
One interesting outcome of my analysis is to suggest that conflicts
among permissive sources equal as to strength results not only from
some indeterminacy, but preserves that indeterminacy — at least with
regard to the strength of the conflicting reasons — for future cases.
The conflict remains “penumbral” and particular legal decisions fail to
settle the issue in so far as the “core” is concerned.208

again and again even though trumped or defeated by equitable conditions in a
particular case.”).
207
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 129 (2d ed., Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph
Raz, eds., 1994)
208
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126-29 (2d ed., Penelope A. Bulloch &
Joseph Raz, eds., 1994); see also NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 124-27 (1981)
(discussing Hart’s theory of core and penumbra). See also BRIAN BIX, LAW,
LANGUAGE AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 18 (1993) (same).
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C. Pragmatic Permissions?
Raz considers that, where reasons of equal strength conflict, both
reasons disappear because they are mutually canceling.209 In that case
there is a permission to rely on any reason because there is no reason to
limit the range of permissible reasons for decision. Raz further claims
that incommensurable reasons do not conflict in this way. They do not
cancel each other and so, logically, do not entail the existence of an
implied permission.210 I suggest a modification of this theory based on
the basketball analogy.
If there is a permission where reasons conflict, it is not due to the
absence of any constraint, but due to the undefeated nature of the
conflicting reasons. So far, the discussion has been limited to conflicts
among commensurable reasons of equal strength. But if, as I claim, the
distinctive feature of an implied legal permission depends upon the
undefeated nature of the competing reasons, then undefeated-ness,
rather than equality, is the key to implied permissions where reasons
conflict.
Conflicts between undefeated reasons, whether equal in strength or
incommensurable, need not logically imply a permission; rather, they
are perhaps better understood as generating what I shall call a
pragmatic permission. Of the conflicting options, none is weightier
than the other, and there is no external reason that can break the tie.
The reasons are thus undefeated and blocked from operating as a
decisive reason. They each operate as a permissible basis for decision
and the judge must choose among them. Furthermore, choice does not
definitively settle the relative strength of the conflicting reasons for the
legal system: the issue of their relative strength is nested so that the
outcome of the conflict remains unresolved for future cases in different
circumstances.
The concept of pragmatic permissions, unlike that of logically implied
permissions, does not distinguish between commensurable and
incommensurable reasons. Both types of reasons generate undefeated
conflicts: incommensurable reasons are undefeated by definition;
commensurable reasons where they are equal in strength. What matters
is the absence of a decisive reason combined with the need to decide.
If this is correct, conflicts among incommensurable reasons result in a
pragmatic permission: to pick among the reasons without having to

209
210

JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 75 (1979).
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 75 (1979).
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adduce a tie-breaking reason. The judge may simply prefer one reason
to the other.
Pragmatic permissions are not limited to conflicts among sources.
Where there is a pragmatic conflict among the available legal reasons,
courts cannot always wait upon the legislature to settle the issue, but
generally must decide as which party is to prevail. That decision
cannot always rest upon some decisive legal, moral, or doctrinal reason.
In such circumstances, there is a legally implied pragmatic permission
to pick among the conflicting reasons. Whatever result is selected will
be legally justified. The “real” basis for picking among the reasons —
the judicial hunch, what the judge had for breakfast, or political
preference — need not be. To that extent, the judge’s choice is
capricious, and expresses strong discretion.
1. Scope of Capricious Decision
How prevalent is capricious decision depends upon how widespread is
incommensurability. There are a number of different points of view on
this front, and space only to sketch them out rather than attempt a
resolution.
Incommensurability skeptics211 such as Ronald Dworkin deny
incommensurability exists and propose a two-step argument to prove it:
first, it is always possible to compare options (comparability is always
an option); so second, the decision to compare or not to compare
expresses one’s social or political commitments rather than some fact
about the structure of value.212 If they are correct then capricious
decision is never an option.
Incommensurability, then, cannot just be assumed or asserted just
because a decision-maker cannot find (or imagine) a reason that
demonstrates that one option is better than the various alternatives. The
absence of comparability does not entail the presence of
211

For a discussion of such skepticism, see JOSEPH RAZ, ENGAGING REASON 50-54
(1999).
212
Dworkin, for example, points out that the various features of incommensurability —
intransitivity, undefeatedness, and change in value — may be explained, individually or
in conjunction, by other features of practical reasoning. Exclusion, for example, explains
how reasons may be both intransitive and incomparable. Other explanations for the
inability to compare reasons may include the operation of a canceling condition, which
knocks one or more competing options out of consideration; the requirement that reasons
operate in a particular order; or that competing values may be vague or open-textured.
See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, On Gaps in the Law, in CONTROVERSIES ABOUT LAW'S
ONTOLOGY, 89, 90 (Paul Amselek and Neil MacCormick, eds, 1991).
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incommensurability.
To demonstrate the existence of
incommensurability, Dworkin claims, requires the production of some
formal or objective mark that explains why the different values cannot
be compared.213
There are a variety of possible rejoinders to Dworkin. One set of
responses suggests that there is some objective “scheme of value”
which “stands behind” and “marks out” the set of commensurable
values from the set of incommensurable ones and determines which
reasons are commensurable or incommensurable with which. Such a
“scheme of value” is supposed to provide a source for
incommensurability.
The simplest scheme of value is one in which all values are, by their
very nature, incommensurable. This is implausible as a universal thesis
about the nature of values because some discrete values can be
compared without loss or transformation. A more sophisticated version
suggests that values are logically grouped into different categories, the
formal features of which render the categories incommensurable inter
se, although the values in each category are commensurable intra se.214
Yet another version suggests that there are certain basic goods or values
that must, as a logical precondition of practical reasoning, be
incommensurable.215
A different thesis is that our decision to consider values
commensurable or not expresses the way in which we value. No
objective scheme of value exists to assure the accuracy of our decision
to commensurate or not. One version of this theory suggests that such
expression may take a more or less standard “social form,” with some
room for experimentation.216 Another version suggests that our
expressions of comparative value are more or less reasonable
dependant upon contextual features.

213

Another theorist who demands such a mark is Richard Epstein. See Richard A
Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, Or Is Utility the Rule of the World?, 1995
UTAH L. REV. 683 (1995).
214
Thomas Nagel, The Fragmentation of Value, in THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL
QUESTIONS 128 (1979).
215
See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, 115 (1980). See also
JOHN FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS, 87-88 (1983); John Finnis,
Commensuration and Public Reason in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY,
AND PRACTICAL REASON 215, 215 (Ruth Chang, ed., 1997); Matthew Adler, Law
and Incommensurability: Introduction, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 1170 (1998).
216
See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 344-58 (1986).
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Finally, it is worth noting that incommensurability may be more or less
worrisome, dependant upon its source and nature. For the most part,
we do not worry about inconsequential incommensurabilities: so long
as judicial choice among apples and oranges has no significant social
consequences there is no great issue in permitting the judge to pick
among the alternatives. Problems arise, however, where choice is of
constitutional magnitude and the stakes are high. I shall conclude by
considering one high-stakes example of incommensurability: what
would happen if sources were in fact incommensurable in the manner
Gardner suggests, and what legal means the judge has to choose among
them.
D. Conflicts Among Incommensurable Permissive Sources of Law
Consider the following modification of Gardner’s argument that there
may be incommensurable sources of law; but these would appear to be
most likely to arise where there is some choice between two
sovereigns, such that comparing them would differently represent or
alter the nature of the authority exercised by one or both of the
sovereigns. One famous example of this phenomenon can be found in
Sophocles' Antigone.217 Polynices lost a quarrel with his brother,
Eteocles, over which of them would succeed their father, Oedipus, to
the throne of Thebes. Thus thwarted, Polynices raised an army to seize
the throne by force. Both brothers died in the ensuing battle. The play
begins with news that Creon, the new king of Thebes, has decreed that
Polynices should be disgraced by remaining unburied, in direct
contravention of religious custom. Polynices' sister, Antigone, thus
faces a choice between conflicting incommensurable institutional
sources: the law of Thebes or the law of the Gods.
The problem is not whether each institution — in broad terms, the state
and the church — is authoritative for her: they both clearly are so.
Antigone’s problem is to determine how she is to accommodate and
give weight to the claims made upon her by each institution; how and
what weight as a source of reasons for action each ought to have.218 To
compare the different sources in terms of its rival, or some third
institutional system, would be to transform them. Accordingly, the
217

Sophocles, Three Theban Plays: Antigone, Oedipus the King, Oedipus at colonus,
(1988).
218
Antigone’s tragedy is thus to exist when the underlying sources of social
obligation are becoming secularized, so that the commands of the Gods are replaced
by considerations of justice. Justice Moore’s claim, infra, that the courts should pay
more attention to the religious bases of American law, is perhaps an attempt to
reverse this process.

54

JUDICIAL CAPRICE
sources are incommensurable. That does not appear to be the situation
presented by the Court of Appeal in Gardner’s example.
There may be incommensurable sources in American law. For
example, the recent controversy surrounding the use of international
sources to interpret various terms of the American Constitution may be
understood as debate over the belief that non-American law provides a
permissive source for interpreting the constitution. Those who resist
the use of foreign sources may be understood to suggest that comparing
the sources transforms, at least, the American legal system. It is not
that the other legal systems are better or worse, they are just
significantly different.219
Another example, and one that perhaps provides a more modern
version of Antigone’s problem, is the American controversy over the
separation of church and state.220 As currently framed, one of the
claims made by religionists is that secularists fail properly to respect
religious values embodied in the structure of American law.221 Where
liberal secularists behave “as if agnosticism about the theistic
foundations of the universe were common ground among believers and
non-believers alike,”222 religion provides not only a separate
epistemology but one that is properly understood as incommensurable,
“really an alien way of knowing the world — alien, at least, in a
political and legal culture in which reason supposedly rules.”223
The religionist’s claim, that secular and religious traditions present
different sources of authority (epistemological and practical) and
distinct standards of reasoning, presents a difficulty for adjudication.
In a society that recognizes multiple religions, or multiple versions of
the same religion, or that religion and un-religion may properly coexist, the problem becomes one of maintaining neutrality between
incommensurable religious traditions. To understand the issues
219

This may, of course, be the Gardner’s claim. If so, he has not expressly made it.
See John Gardner Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J. LEG.
STUD. 457, 459-60 (1988); compare Worcester Works Finance Ltd. v. Cooden Eng.
Co. Ltd. [1972] 1 Q.B. 210. From an institutional point of view, moreover,
Gardner’s choice of authorities are clearly comparable among the hierarchy of courts.
220
Particularly the Establishment Clause jurisprudence codified in the Lemon test.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
221
See, e.g., Glassroth v Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003) (presenting
religionist’s disagreement with Supreme Court over moral status of Ten
Commandments).
222
Michael McConnell, God is Dead and We Have Killed Him: Freedom of Religion
in the Post-Modern Age, 1993 BRIGHAM YOUNG U. L. REV. 163, 174 (1993)
223
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 142 (1993).
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presented in terms of one tradition (and use it as a basis for decision) is
exactly to endorse that tradition.224 Choosing precisely transforms the
source and style of epistemological and practical authority to that of the
chosen religion.225
A particularly strong version of the religionists claim is presented in
Glassroth v. Moore,226 a case in which Roy Moore, the then-Chief
Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, placed a 5280-pound granite
monument in the rotunda of the Alabama State Judicial Building.227
Moore’s purpose was “to remind all Alabama citizens of, among other
things, his belief in the sovereignty of the Judeo-Christian God over
both the state and the church.”228
Is Justice Moore asserting that the Ten Commandments, precisely
because it is a repository of Judeo-Christian morality,229 is a permissive
Imagine that, contrary to current
source of legal values?230
interpretations of American law, Moore is correct that the Decalogue is
a permissive source. There would then be an incommensurable conflict
224

To the extent that the adjudicator remains neutral among religions, and seeks
some rational (as opposed to faith based) means of deciding among them, she
remains in the secular, alien realm.
225
That may be the very goal of some religionists (so long as the chosen religion is
theirs). Appiah, for example, suggests that such a choice is a high-stakes gamble:
“The ultimate result of such epistemic forbearance [adopting the religionists
viewpoint and alternative epistemology], however, goes beyond protecting the
sectarian from unwelcome interference; the ultimate result is to erase the legal
distinction between spiritual and temporal considerations,” KWAME ANTHONY
APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY 87 (2005) — a result which positively invites
secular interference.
Another means of making the link between Antigone and the modern Establishment
Clause debate is to consider an interpretation of the play suggesting that Antigone
goes out of her way to deny the city’s law and so herself creates the conflict between
the two sources. Perhaps that is one way of understanding one religionist demand
that its epistemology be properly acknowledged in the secular sphere.
226
335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003).
227
Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1285.
228
335 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2003). Moore‘s campaign for the Alabama
Supreme Court depicted him as “the ‘Ten Commandments Judge” . . . . The central
platform of his campaign was a promise ‘to restore the moral foundation of law.’”
Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1285. Furthermore, when dedicating the monument, “He
explained that the location of the monument was ‘fitting and proper’ because: “this
monument will serve to remind the appellate courts and judges of the circuit and
district courts of this state, of the truth stated in the preamble of the Alabama
Constitution, that in order to establish justice, we must invoke ‘the favor and
guidance of Almighty God.’” Id.
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In other words, for Moore it is the Decalogue’s source, as a command from God,
rather than its content, that establishes it as a permissive source of law.
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He may mean to suggest that the Decalogue is a mandatory source that trumps all
other sources of law.
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between the Establishment Clause, purporting to preclude the
government from preferring a particular (or any) religion, and the
Decalogue as a founding text of a particular religion or set of religions.
Here, the nature and sources of American government are at stake.
That appears to be precisely how Roy Moore sees things.
Nonetheless, the problematic legal status of the Decalogue brings to the
fore the core tenet of legal positivism: some sources of practical
authority are not legal sources. Legal sources are the relevant lawcreating institutions of a particular legal system. Because the law is an
exclusionary system, courts are entitled to rely upon the rules created
by legal sources and ignore those created by non-legal sources.
Exclusion provides an alternative to incommensurability as grounds for
rejecting the Decalogue. Accordingly, from the point of view of the
United States Constitution, as currently interpreted, religion is not only
an incommensurable, but also an excluded source of legal norms.
V. CONCLUSION
I have suggested that a judge has both a legal power and a legal
permission to simply pick an outcome from among multiple available
options where legal incommensurability is matched by moral and
doctrinal incommensurability. Accordingly, the Noble Dream of willless decision, which holds that the judge’s personal preference never
operates — or should never operate — to determine the result of a case,
is unattainable in legal systems where some of the reasons are
incommensurable. Capricious decision is a necessary feature of such
systems. How widespread a feature depends upon the amount of
incommensurability in the various legal reasons for decision.
Furthermore, the absence of a decisive reason does not entail that there
is a gap in the law. We thus should not assume that it is only in
unregulated cases, where there is a legal gap, that the judge is able to
utilize her discretion. An implied pragmatic permission arises where
commensurable reasons of equal strength or incommensurable reasons
conflict. The court has the power and the duty to apply the norms of
the legal system, but in the system is ambivalent as to which of two
conflicting norms the court should choose. The legal system thus
grants the court a permission to choose which of the conflicting reasons
it wishes to apply. There is no gap because whichever norm the court
chooses to apply has a legal source. The case is regulated. This
suggests that there is not always an easy correlation with the presence
of a discretion for the court, and the presence of a gap in the law.
There may be no gap, but still a discretion. This point complements
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Raz’s belief that, when reasoning according to law, that there may be
no discretion in the presence of a gap.
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